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INTRODUCTION
In a November 20, 1990 policy guidance, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced that its field
offices would accept charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 from testers or organizations filing charges for
testers.2 The EEOC defined "testers" as "individuals who apply
for employment which they do not intend to accept, for the sole
purpose of uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring practices,"
specifically discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.3
Since then, several organizations have used testers to uncover
and to remedy employment discrimination. The Urban
Institute utilized testers in a study performed to measure
discriminatory hiring practices.4 The National Association for
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
2. Notice No. N-915-062, (2 Interpretations] EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2168,
at 2314 (Nov. 20, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance]. The Commission first
considered accepting charges from testers after an in-depth nationwide investigation
of employment agencies revealed widespread Title VII violations in recruitment policies.
See EEOC Chairman Says Agency Receiving Influx of Charges Against Job Agencies,
1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at A-1 (June 12, 1991).
3. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 2, 1 2168, at 2313-15.
4. MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTU-
NrTIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991). The Urban Institute
pioneered a "hiring audit" methodology using testers in a parallel study measuring
employment discrimination against Hispanics in Chicago and San Diego. HARRY CROSS,
URBAN INST., EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF HISPANIC
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the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has used testers
to obtain evidence on which to base charges of discrimination,5
as have the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington,
a private civil rights advocacy group in Washington, D.C.,6 and
AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERS (1990). In its latest study, the Urban Institute recruited
college students between the ages of 19 and 24 to be testers. Most were between five-
feet, eight-inches and five-feet, ten-inches tall. A black male and a white male then
were matched preliminarily on attributes such as age, physical size, education,
experience, openness, energy level, and articulateness. TURNER ET AL., supra, at 25.
If a match of objective educational credentials or job experiences was impossible, Urban
Institute personnel created false resumes or job applications for the testers. Most of the
testers posed as recent high school graduates with limited work experience. Id. at 26.
All testers participated in a training session to make the pairs as similar as possible.
They received detailed instructions on how to apply for employment, learned a
standardized method for filling out job applications and conducting interviews,
completed mock interviews, and observed others in different interview situations.
Trainers pointed out and helped to minimize differences in the way the partners reacted
to prospective employers in a wide range of circumstances. Id. Senior project staff
finalized the pairs based on similarities in appearance, mannerisms, personality, and
interview style. Id.
After the training, openings for entry-level jobs were identified in the help-wanted
ads of the local newspaper. Each tester separately pursued the positions. Testers were
instructed to withdraw from consideration from a job if they were asked to take a test
or to attend training sessions, if they encountered someone at the job site they knew,
or if the employer seemed to suspect the test. Id. at 20-23.
Urban Institute personnel then compared the experiences and outcomes of the paired
testers. The Urban Institute found that young black job seekers were denied jobs
offered to similarly credentialed white applicants fifteen percent of the time and that
an additional five percent of the time a black applicant did not get as far in the hiring
process as the paired white applicant. White job seekers were denied jobs offered to
similarly credentialed black applicants only five percent of the time, and the black
applicant got farther in the hiring process only an additional two percent. Id. at 39.
5. After receiving unsolicited complaints of discrimination in hiring at major
Miami department stores, NAACP testers applied for employment at eight stores. In
one store, a black female law student was denied a sales position despite extensive
work experience and several follow-up efforts. A white female college student with
some work experience who applied for the same job on the same day was offered a
position immediately. In a second test at the same store, a black college student with
work experience was offered a job for two weeks, while a white college student with no
work experience who applied for a job the same day was offered work for a month.
NAACP Uses 'Testers' as Basis of Bias Complaint Against Miami Store, 1990 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 247, at A-5 (Dec. 24, 1990). The NAACP also filed complaints in
Florida with the EEOC based on a six-month testing program that revealed widespread
discrimination in hiring practices by employers in Miami hotels and restaurants. The
employers allegedly offered black applicants menial jobs and gave similarly qualified
white applicants higher paying positions. Id.
6. The Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington (Fair Employment
Council) employed two white and two black male testers with similar backgrounds, all
of whom were undergraduates at Georgetown University. The testers sought referrals
to entry-level jobs through Snelling & Snelling, a national personnel recruitment
agency. Snelling & Snelling allegedly sent the white testers but not the black testers
on employment interviews. Washington Civil Rights Group Uses Testers as Basis for
Bias Suit Against Personnel Agency, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 86, at A-3 (May
3, 1991).
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the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, a state
administrative agency.
7
In its policy guidance, the EEOC asserted that testers have
standing to bring actions under Title VII.8 It concluded that
every person has a right under Title VII to have an employment
application considered without reference to race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, regardless of whether the applicant
intends to accept an employment offer. According to the EEOC,
the applicant suffers an injury if an employer violates that
right, even if the applicant does not lose a real employment
opportunity.9
In January 1991, the EEOC announced that its Office of
Legal Counsel was determining whether the agency had the
authority to use its own personnel as testers. In addition, the
office was considering "the potential liability the agency could
face if it developed an in-house approach."10
The EEOC's decisions to accept charges from testers and to
consider using its own testers have been criticized harshly by
employers' groups and others in the business community. In
February 1991, the Equal Employment Advisory Council
(Advisory Council), an organization representing major
companies, urged Evan J. Kemp, then the Chair of the EEOC,11
to reconsider the agency's positions.12 The Advisory Council
The Fair Employment Council filed a charge of race discrimination in federal court
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988) and the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to -2557 (replacement vol. 1992 & Supp. 1993),
based on evidence obtained by the testers who applied for employment referrals with
Snelling & Snelling. Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 1993 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 118, at E-1 (D.D.C. June 22, 1993).
7. Employment testers hired by the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (the Commission) reported that white applicants at two Boston clothing
stores were told ofjob opportunities while black applicants with the same qualifications
were told that no positions were available. The Commission reached settlements with
the stores in April 1993, in which the stores agreed to fund Commission programs
fostering equal opportunities for blacks in Massachusetts and to participate in minority
outreach and management awareness training. Massachusetts Agency Settles Job
Tester Cases, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 77, at A-18 (Apr. 23, 1993).
8. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 2, at 2313-15.
9. Id.
10. EEOC Is Expanding Look at 'Testers' Issue; Agency May Use Its Own to
Investigate Bias, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at A-9 (Jan. 9, 1991).
11. Mr. Kemp resigned as Chair of the EEOC on April 2, 1993, and President
Clinton named Tony Gallegos as Acting Chair effective April 5, 1993. White House
Taps Gallegos as Acting Chairman of EEOC, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 63, at
A-10 (Apr. 5, 1993). The President has not yet named a permanent Chair.
12. Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris, President, Equal Employment Advisory Council,
to the Honorable Evan J. Kemp, Chairman, EEOC (Feb. 12, 1991), in Equal
Employment Advisory Council Letter on Proposed Testing Policy at EEOC, 1991 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-1 (Feb. 14, 1991).
WINTER 1993] Using Testers to Fill an Enforcement Void 407
complained that testers would waste employers' resources, 3
that testers could be used by private parties to harass
employers and extort settlements, 14 and that use of testers by
the EEOC would harm the agency's public image and
effectiveness. 15 John S. Irving, formerly General Counsel to the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and now in private
practice representing employers, has also argued that the
EEOC's use of testers would be inconsistent with the agency's
13. The Advisory Council complained that law-abiding employers will waste time
and money "interviewing, evaluating, testing, and checking the references of persons
who have no real interest in employment," and may lose the services of a legitimate
prospective employee by offering a job first to a tester. Id.
14. The Advisory Council expressed concern that testers could be used for
retaliatory and extortionary purposes and that "lawyers seeking to stir up litigation will
engage testers to go out looking for incidents they can use as grounds for filing charges
of discrimination that can then be made into lawsuits." Id. The major concern
expressed by the Advisory Council was the absence in the policy guidance of any limits
or guidelines for the use of testers. The Advisory Council argued that testers in
employment cases must engage in more elaborate deception to appear qualified than
testers in housing discrimination cases, where testing is an accepted practice. The
Advisory Council worried that:
To "appear qualified," testers might find it necessary to present false credentials,
bogus academic transcripts, made-up work histories, forged letters of reference,
faked passports or work authorizations, counterfeit licenses, falsified professional
ratings, perhaps even false security clearances.
To bring themselves within a protected class, testers might feign disabilities,
falsify medical histories, and/or lie about their ability or inability to perform
particular job functions ....
Id. at E-2. The Advisory Council asked the EEOC how far testers could go in using
deception to appear qualified and to obtain evidence of discrimination. Id. It asked
whether the EEOC intends to let
the courts ... set limits on what testers properly can and cannot do, or [whether]
the Commission [will] take a lead in establishing standards .... [A]ssuming that
the Commission does intend that some minimum standards of fairness be
observed by testers, is there really any way it can make its "army of citizens"
abide by such standards?
Id.
Others are troubled by the notion of the EEOC making misrepresentations to
employers in the context of a testing program. During the debates that preceded the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Senator Alan Simpson introduced an
amendment to the act that, inter alia, would have prohibited the EEOC, if it ran a
testing program, from allowing job applicants to misrepresent their education,
experience, or other qualifications. 137 CONG. REc. S15,487 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Simpson).
15. Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris to the Honorable Evan J. Kemp, supra note 12,
at E-5. The Council suggested that employers would be less likely to comply voluntarily
with the EEOC and would not trust reasonable-cause findings by the agency if they
believed that the EEOC had deceived them to obtain evidence of discrimination. Id.
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role as a neutral fact finder in evaluating and investigating
discrimination charges.'6
16. Irving predicted that an EEOC tester program would result in a substantial
diminution in employer cooperation. Letter from John S. Irving, former General
Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, to the Honorable Evan J. Kemp, Chairman,
EEOC (Mar. 4, 1991), in Correspondence Between John Irving and EEOC Chairman
Evan Kemp on Use of 'Testers' by Commission, 1991 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at
E-1 (Apr. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Correspondence]. Irving argued that
[an investigation triggered by the charge or testimony of a tester begins with
a lie .... The tester is a liar and a deceiver from the outset and hardly the type
of witness for whose honesty the Commission should want to vouch. It is difficult
to see how the Commission would feel confident making investigative
determinations in reliance upon deceivers such as testers.
Id. at E-2. Irving continued, "The Agency's case backlog would surge. And settlements,
any administrative agency's lifeblood, fostered by respect for Agency fairness and
objectivity, would plummet." Id.
Irving explained that, in light of the substantial costs and resources involved in
evaluating applicants for employment, his clients could require an applicant to certify
that he has a genuine interest in employment. Applicants who refused to sign a
certification would not receive further consideration. Irving added that the certification
would expose "beyond question the willingness of testers to lie and deceive, thus
fundamentally undermining their credibility... as charging parties and witnesses."
Id. Irving asked the EEOC to reconsider its position, and he asked for an opinion on
the propriety of the use of certifications of a bona fide interest in employment. Id.
Then-Chairman Kemp responded to Irving's concern about the potential erosion of
public confidence in the EEOC by stating that testing has been used effectively in
housing discrimination cases for many years. Letter from the Honorable Evan J. Kemp,
Chairman, EEOC, to John S. Irving, former General Counsel, National Labor Relations
Board (Apr. 17, 1991), in Correspondence, supra, at E-5. Kemp pointed out that Con-
gress has authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to fund testing by private civil rights groups. The Federal Trade
Commission also conducts testing to detect discrimination by creditors and financial
institutions. Id.
Kemp explained that a tester's certification of genuine interest in employment would
not preclude the use of the tester's testimony concerning disparate treatment, because
a "finding of bias or improper motivation on the part of the tester ... would be based
on the totality of the evidence." Id. Kemp stated that "[m]isrepresentation is integral
to any covert law enforcement objective .... [This] does not diminish the reliability of
the evidence ... obtain[ed]." Id. Kemp opined, however, that no federal statutory or
regulatory requirement would prohibit an employer from using a certification of genuine
interest in employment. Id.
In response, Irving criticized Kemp's view that misrepresentations made by testers
to secure evidence could be separated neatly from the quality of the evidence obtained
by the testers. Letter from John S. Irving, former General Counsel, National Labor
Relations Board, to the Honorable Evan J. Kemp, Chairman, EEOC (Apr. 25, 1991), in
Correspondence, supra, at E-7. He characterized Kemp's position as follows: [L]ies and
misrepresentations are justified when needed to obtain evidence of employment
discrimination." Irving suggested that this "ends justifies the means justification"
placed the EEOC on "a slippery slope." Id. He warned that if EEOC investigative
personnel functioned as testers, "the scope of their authority to act as testers in aid of
the Commission's policies, instructions from Commission personnel, and even testimony
from testers' EEOC supervisors or other principles [sic], could be legitimate subjects for
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The EEOC continues to accept discrimination charges from
testers, but to date it appears to have decided against
implementing its own testing program. 17 This Article argues
that Congress should authorize the EEOC to use its own testers
and that the EEOC should exercise that authority.
Part I of this Article concludes that the current enforcement
scheme under Title VII has resulted in underenforcement of the
Act in the context of hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level jobs,
and that testers should be used to fill that enforcement void.
Part II agrees with the EEOC's conclusion that testers have
standing to sue under Title VII.
Parts III and IV assert that the EEOC cannot rely on private
testers to fill the enforcement void. First, under current
doctrine, prevailing testers can obtain only "de minimis" or
"technical" relief from an offending employer and therefore
cannot recover attorneys' fees. Moreover, opponents of testing
may use state common-law causes of action and attorney
disciplinary rules against testers and their counsel to deter the
use of testers.
Parts V and VI conclude that the EEOC currently is not
authorized to conduct its own testing program, but that the
problems associated with the private use of testers would be
solved if Congress amended Title VII to give the EEOC the
power to use testers to uncover discrimination in hiring for
lower-skilled, entry-level positions. State common law and
statutory causes of action would be preempted, and Congress
could limit the use of testers specifically to remedy
discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level posi-
tions-where the benefits of testing outweigh its potential costs.
The EEOC could issue rules and regulations prescribing the
methods to be used for testing, including the employer-targeting
process. Finally, the Article concludes in Part VII that testing
by the EEOC would not constitute entrapment and would not
exploration in discovery and at trial." Id. He urged that "the impact of these conse-
quences upon the Commission's law enforcement activities, including the possibility
that Commission personnel could be judicially discredited, are important considerations
in weighing the usefulness and practicality of the Commission sponsorship of any tester
program." Id.
17. Kemp seemed to have been persuaded by the numerous complaints from the
business community that "direct government involvement would be tantamount to
entrapment." Therefore, he led the EEOC away from using testers to conduct its own
investigations. See Anne Kornhauser, Tracking Down Employment Discrimination, THE
RECORDER, May 8, 1991, at 1, 8. Since Kemp's decision to step down as Chair of the
EEOC, the Agency has not revisited that issue publicly.
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upset the EEOC's relationship with respondent employers or
otherwise undermine the agency's effectiveness.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT VOID
Ordinarily, Title VII suits are instituted by individuals who
suspect that they were victimized by employment discrimi-
nation. If these private actions result in an optimum level of
enforcement, then there are few if any benefits to using testers
to enforce Title VII. There is reason to believe, however, that
the use of testers could fill an existing enforcement void in the
private enforcement regime of Title VII.
Much of the original support for employment discrimination
laws came from those whose goal was to eliminate barriers in
hiring that excluded blacks and others from the labor force.'"
Today, however, discrimination in hiring draws little analytic
attention. 9 Studying, understanding, and eradicating hiring
discrimination should become a policy priority once again.
While progress has been made in reducing wage differentials
between white and black workers, there remains a substantial
gap in labor-force participation. The joblessness rate for blacks
is consistently higher than the rate for whites. The joblessness
rate for young black males is over twice the rate for young
white males.2"
Although some of this gap no doubt is caused by factors other
than employment discrimination, a significant amount appears
to be attributable to discrimination.2' As mentioned previously,
a recent study by the Urban Institute using testers applying for
low-skilled, entry-level positions concluded that young black
jobseekers often were denied jobs offered to similarly
credentialed whites and that other times the black applicant
did not get as far in the hiring process as the white counter-
part.2
2
18. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991).
19. Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk, An Overview ofAuditing for Discrimination,
in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA
1, 13 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1992).
20. TURNER ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.
21. Id. at 6-7. '
22. Id. at 2. For a discussion of the methodology employed in that study and the
results, see supra note 4. A study using testers conducted by the Fair Employment
Council has found similar rates of disparate treatment. MARC BENDICK, JR. ET AL.,
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Nonetheless, Title VII increasingly is being invoked to contest
discharges from employment rather than to challenge hiring
decisions. Discriminatory hiring charges filed with the EEOC
in 1966 outnumbered termination charges by fifty percent; by
1985 the ratio was reversed by more than six to one.23 Title VII
now is used predominantly to protect the existing positions of
incumbent workers.24
One explanation for this trend is that there is now less
blatant discrimination in hiring, which no doubt is true.2 5
Litigation in the sixties and seventies removed many of the
most formidable and blatant employment practices barring the
entry of minorities and women into the workforce. Moreover,
"disparate impact" litigation challenged facially neutral employ-
ment practices, forcing employers to remove many systematic
barriers to equal employment opportunity.26
Reduced discrimination, however, cannot explain entirely the
disparity between the numbers of Title VII discharge and hiring
cases now being filed. It would be irrational for an employer
inclined to discriminate to hire a worker from a group the
employer disfavored only to fire the worker once on the job,
especially in light of the higher penalties for unlawful termina-
tion and the greater likelihood of a suit challenging a
discharge. 27 At least some of the gap must be attributable to
the high transaction costs and other disincentives to suits
challenging discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-
level positions. These costs and other disincentives probably
have led to underenforcement of Title VII in these types of
cases.
28
FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL OF GREATER WASH., INC., MEASURING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION THROUGH CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS (May 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
23. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 1015; see also Minna J. Kotkin, Public
Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 1301, 1346-47 (1990) (finding that between 1974 and 1985, charges filed with the
EEOC alleging failure to hire on the basis of race decreased as a percentage of total
charges from 12% to 6% and charges alleging race discrimination in employment
termination rose during the same period from 23% to 37%). For the years 1989 to 1991,
the ratio of discharge to hiring claims was roughly seven to one. Telephone Interview
with Barbara Roberts, EEOC Public Information Officer (June 17, 1992).
24. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 984.
25. Fix & Struyk, supra note 19, at 9.
26. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 1017-21.
27. Id. at 1017.
28. This is not to suggest that the volume of discharge suits currently filed under
Title VII is optimal. There probably is excessive litigation in this area as members of
protected classes use Title VII to challenge what they perceive to be arbitrary or
otherwise unjustified discharges. There is reason to believe, however, that the ratio of
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First, an individual discharged from employment is more
likely to sue than an individual denied employment because the
former has devoted time and energy to the relationship with the
employer. The discharged individual who has spent years on
the job will feel that something has been taken away from her.29
Second, an individual who is not hired, particularly for a lower-
skilled, entry-level position, is less likely to suspect discrimina-
tion. "Contact between the applicant and the employer during
the hiring process is typically fleeting," the eventual outcome
and the make-up of the applicant pool are unknown to the
applicant, the applicant knows little about the decisionmakers,
and "the process itself rarely signals exclusionary intent."0
Presumably, the applicant simply will continue to look
elsewhere for employment. If she is successful, she will have
little if any incentive to consider whether there was discrimi-
nation earlier in her job search. Moreover, if she finds a
position quickly, the back-pay remedy may be worthless.3
Even if the individual does not find employment and suspects
discrimination, significant barriers to suit remain. A plaintiff
must be committed seriously to the litigation. Charging parties
currently wait an average of almost two years for resolution of
Title VII claims.3 2 Moreover, discrimination in hiring for lower-
skilled, entry-level positions is quite difficult to prove. General-
ly there is little if any paper record.33 Employers may rebut
the plaintiffs prima facie case by articulating any subjective,
nondiscriminatory factor to justify a hiring decision.34
Another significant problem faced by an individual who
suspects discrimination in hiring for a lower-skilled, entry-level
position is finding a lawyer. Because these jobs typically pay
lower wages, the plaintiff may have difficulty paying a lawyer.
Relying on a contingent fee agreement also may be problematic
because the lower wages used to generate a back-pay award
may not compensate a lawyer adequately. 35 Finally, attorneys'
hiring cases to discharge cases filed does not accurately reflect the amount of
discrimination in hiring relative to the amount of discrimination in discharges.
29. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 1024-25; see also Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984
SuP. CT. REv. 1, 58.
30. Fix & Struyk, supra note 19, at 13-14.
31. E.g., Oliver v. Moberly Mo. Sch. Dist., 427 F. Supp. 82, 88 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
32. Kotkin, supra note 23, at 1327 n.107.
33. Fix & Struyk, supra note 19, at 18.
34. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
35. It is too early to tell whether the amendments to Title VII permitting awards
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fees are available only to prevailing parties. The difficulty and
expense of proving a discrimination claim involving hiring for
a lower-skilled, entry-level position will deter many attorneys
from relying on the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees to
accept a case.
The efficacy of Title VII depends in part on the willingness
and ability of individuals to bring private suits challenging
discriminatory employment practices. When private and social
incentives to sue differ, the system may fail to produce the
optimal amount and composition of litigation.36 If victims do
not sue, employers have less economic incentive to comply with
the statute. It appears that Title VII does not provide employ-
ers with much incentive to avoid discrimination in hiring for
lower-skilled, entry-level positions because the risk of suit is so
low. Moreover, because an employee who is a member of a
protected class may sue if discharged, Title VII actually may
create some incentive for employers not to hire women and
minorities. 37
Testing can help to root out discriminatory practices where
the disincentives to bring a private suit result in
underenforcement. Testing can detect "opportunity-
diminishing" as well as "opportunity-denying" behavior.3"
Opportunity-diminishing behavior includes difficulty in
obtaining a job application, negative comments, lengthy
interview waiting time, cursory interviews, and disparate
treatment in the quality of jobs offered.39 These are all subtle
signs of discouragement that are hard to detect and would
permit an employer bent on discrimination to avoid taking
actions which would constitute clear violations of the law.4°
The use of testers can uncover employment discrimination that
otherwise is unprovable because of its subtle form.4'
of compensatory and punitive damages will tend to make attorneys more available in
cases offering no hope of a substantial back-pay award. For a discussion of these
amendments, see infra Part III.E.
36. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 1023.
37. Id. at 1024.
38. Fix & Struyk, supra note 19, at 24.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In fact, "the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to
compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination [in
employment] is hard to come by." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The experience with testers in housing discrimination cases
suggests that testers' suits are far more likely than nontester
suits to result in settlements favorable to the plaintiff.
4 2
Comparative evidence generated by testers can go a long way
toward meeting the plaintiff's burden in a Title VII case.
Although the Supreme Court has stressed that a plaintiff need
not offer direct proof of discrimination to prevail under Title
VII, it recently held in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks'3 that
a plaintiff does not prevail in a disparate treatment case by
showing that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason
for refusing to hire is a pretext." The dissenting Justices
appear to be correct that many plaintiffs without direct
evidence of discrimination will lose under Hicks.4 Testers can
generate the comparative evidence necessary to prevail under
Hicks.
Many critics of testing, however, correctly argue that testing
poses greater potential costs to employers than it does to those
subject to the fair housing laws. In particular, they note that
more subjective factors legitimately may be considered in
employment decisions than in decisions about selling or renting
housing.
Nevertheless, the hiring process for lower-skilled, entry-level
positions is usually a summary one, very similar to the rental
of a housing unit." Employers' out-of-pocket and opportunity
costs associated with evaluating and selecting applicants for
these types of positions are minimal. Processing an application
for most of these positions requires little time or energy.
Moreover, because the pool of qualified candidates is larger,
employers are unlikely to lose the services of qualified candi-
dates by focusing hiring efforts on a tester. "It is possible to
monitor the early phases of these transactions without becom-
ing involved in the kind of complex interpersonal exchanges
that would entail outcomes based largely on subjective
criteria." 7
For higher-skilled, upper-level positions, an employer may
expend significant time and money screening, testing, inter-
viewing, and otherwise evaluating candidates for employment.
42. Id. at 15.
43. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
44. Id. at 2748-49.
45. See id. at 2761-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46. Fix & Struyk, supra note 19, at 18.
47. Id.
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Moreover, the pool of qualified applicants generally will be
smaller. Therefore, it is more likely that an employer could lose
other qualified applicants by offering the position to a tester.
Testing for discrimination in hiring for upper-level positions
involves intrusion into a more complex transaction. It is more
difficult to feign the qualifications necessary for some higher-
skilled positions, such as engineering, for example. This poses
serious recruitment problems for testing programs.4"
Most importantly, testing for discrimination in hiring for
upper-level positions is unnecessary because the victim has
more incentive to sue and perhaps a greater likelihood of
success. Testing would not fill an enforcement void in that
context. Therefore, the costs to the employer probably would
outweigh any benefits of testing for discriminatory hiring
practices in that context.49
In hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level positions, the minimal
costs to employers caused by the use of testers will be
outweighed by the benefits of more optimal enforcement of Title
VII's proscription of discrimination in hiring. Moreover, a focus
on hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level positions is appropriate
because these jobs offer applicants the possibility to establish
a "foothold" in the formal economy and to move up the
socioeconomic ladder.5 ° Therefore, testers should be used to
uncover and remedy discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled,
entry-level jobs.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION TESTERS'
STANDING TO SUE
The EEOC has concluded correctly that testers have standing
to sue under Title VII because testers and other applicants
have a right to be considered for employment without regard to
their race or sex.51 Article III federal courts are empowered to
decide only "cases and controversies"; the standing requirement
is a product of this limitation.52 To have standing to sue, a
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18-19.
50. Id. at 19-20.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
52. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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plaintiff must show a sufficient personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation.53 The Supreme Court has acknowledged,
however, that it has been inconsistent in defining Article III
standing.' Some members of the Court and some commenta-
tors have been more critical of the standing doctrine's complex-
ity.5
5
The current incarnation of Article III's standing requirement,
which the Court has stated can be "distilled from [its]
decisions,"56 has three elements. First, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an injury in fact. The plaintiff next must show
that the injury can be traced to the challenged action. Finally,
the plaintiff must show that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision on the merits.57 In addition, the Court
has articulated a number of "prudential limitations" on stand-
ing that are not mandated by Article III.58 Congress by statute
Article III's requirements do not apply to state court actions. See, e.g., International
Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700,
1705 n.4 (1991).
53. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962), which states that "the standing question is whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers on his behalf"); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) (stating that standing addresses whether a
party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy).
54. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
55. For example, Justice Brennan in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), wrote,
The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has become an area of
incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears to have been
designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance. The
Court has itself characterized its law of standing as a "complicated specialty of
federal jurisdiction." ... One cannot help asking why this should be true.
Id. at 66 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see
also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820,828 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting a "welter and confusion
of case law" in the area of standing), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984). Professor William Fletcher wrote, "The structure of standing law in the federal
courts has long been criticized as incoherent ... , 'permeated with sophistry,' as 'a
word game played by secret rules,' and more recently as a largely meaningless 'litany'
recited before 'the Court ... chooses up sides and decides the case. '" William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) (citations omitted)
(second deletion in original).
56. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155.
57. Id.; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1982).
58. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). These prudential limitations on
standing require that the plaintiff generally must assert her own legal rights and
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may negate any prudential limitations and extend standing to
the limits of Article II.
59
Although the Court has not spoken with one voice on this
issue, it often has stated that the standing inquiry is related
intimately to the particular cause of action asserted by the
plaintiff.60 The Court has written that "Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute." " Professor William Fletcher has stated, consistent
interests, not those of third parties. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474.
The Court also has refused to adjudicate what it refers to as "'abstract questions of
wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared
and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches [of government]." Id.
at 475 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)). Finally, the Court
requires that the plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests that the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question is intended to protect or regulate. Id. at 475.
59. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100; Simon, 426 U.S. at 58-59 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Fletcher, supra note 55, at 223, 252. But cf Kansas v. Utilicorp
United Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990) (holding that although § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988), provides a cause of action to any person injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws, the Court's "indirect
purchaser rule" bars a suit by customers of a utility against a supplier who illegally
overcharged the utility even though the entire overcharge was passed on to the custom-
ers).
60. In International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991), the Court stated that
[s]tanding does not refer simply to a party's capacity to appear in court.
Rather, standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or constitutional
claims that a party presents. "Typically,... the standing inquiry requires careful
judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the
particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted."
Id. at 1704 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (deletion in the original);
cf infra note 62 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the Court has stressed on several occasions that the standing inquiry
is a threshold determination that "in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs
contention that particular conduct is illegal." Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (stating that the
rules of standing are threshold determinants of the propriety ofjudicial intervention),
quoted in Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155; see also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 52 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that standing focuses on
the stake of the party seeking to get a complaint before a federal court and not on the
issues to be adjudicated).
61. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); see also Valley Forge
Christian College, 454 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes a
fundamental mistake when it determines that a plaintiff has failed to satisfy... any
... test of 'standing,' without first determining whether the Constitution or statute
defines injury, and creates a cause of action for redress of that injury, in precisely the
circumstance presented to the Court."); Simon, 426 U.S. at 54 n.5 (holding that
Congress may create new interests, the invasion of which will confer standing); Warth,
422 U.S. at 500 (noting that the existence of Article III standing "often turns on the
nature and source of the claim asserted"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3
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with this reasoning, that the standing question should focus on
whether the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim.62 Con-
gress's power to create a duty or right should include the power
to decide who has standing to enforce it. 63  When a plaintiff
seeks to enforce an interest that is protected by statute, asking
(1972) (stating that whether a litigant is the proper party to adjudicate a particular
issue is a question within Congress's power to determine); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that
"standing may be based on an interest created by... a statute").
62. Fletcher, supra note 55, at 223, 229 (arguing that standing "should be seen as
a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory... provision
whose protection is invoked"); cf Christopher K. Skinner, Comment, Fair Housing-The
Use of Testers to Enforce Fair Housing Laws-When Testers Are Sued, 21 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 170, 190 (1977) (arguing that the question whether a black tester has standing to
sue under the Fair Housing Act "requires a close examination of the language of the
statute"). But see Paul A. LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an
Alternative Framework for Analysis, 1982 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1018, 1019 (arguing that
focusing on whether the defendant invaded a plaintiff's congressionally created right
is not properly a standing inquiry, but raises instead the separate question whether the
plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted). Professor LeBel argues
that the only Article III requirement for standing is the presence of an adverse relation-
ship and that the courts should consider a number of practical limitations on standing
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1033-34.
According to Professor Fletcher, being more sensitive to the particular right at issue
and to the proper definition of the plaintiff class is more consistent with the historical
approach to standing than is applying disembodied and abstract general principles.
Fletcher, supra note 55, at 249. The Court itself has suggested that the search for a
"standing formula" has led to the confusion of the law in this area. See Valley Forge
Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (noting that inconsistency in standing cases
demonstrates that the concept cannot be defined tersely).
63. Fletcher, supra note 55, at 223-24. "So long as the substantive rule [it creates]
is constitutionally permissible, Congress should have plenary power to create statutory
duties and to provide enforcement mechanisms for them. . . ." Id. at 251. See generally
Kenneth C. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 645, 654-69 (1973). The Congressional power to confer standing by creating legal
rights has some limits. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (noting that Congress may
legislate without regard to prudential standing rules but must abide by Article III's
requirement of distinct and palpable injury); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d
1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "Congress may not circumvent Article III by
authorizing someone whose substantive rights have not been invaded to sue to redress
an invasion of someone else's substantive rights").
Superimposing a test for standing on a statutory cause of action, however, is a way
for the Court to enlarge its powers at the expense of Congress:
For the Court to limit the power of Congress to create statutory rights enforceable
by certain groups of people-to limit, in other words, the power of Congress to
create standing-is to limit the power of Congress to define and protect against
certain kinds of injury that the Court thinks it improper to protect against.
Fletcher, supra note 55, at 233. Superimposing such a test "limits the power of the
legislature to articulate public values and choose the manner in which they may be
enforced." Id. In effect, it becomes a form of substantive due process.
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whether that plaintiff has standing is the same as asking
whether that plaintiff has a claim on the merits."
The best example of the Court's application of this principal
is Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,65 which involved the
standing of testers to sue under the Fair Housing Act of 1968
(FHA).6" The defendant realty company and one of its
employees allegedly engaged in "racial steering." They purport-
edly showed black applicants buildings occupied primarily by
blacks and refused to show them buildings and neighborhoods
occupied primarily by whites.67
The plaintiffs were three individuals and an organization
committed to combatting housing discrimination in Richmond,
Virginia. The organization, Housing Opportunities Made Equal
(HOME), operated a housing counseling service and investigat-
ed and referred complaints alleging housing discrimination.6"
One of the individual plaintiffs was a black man interested in
renting an apartment. The defendants falsely told him that no
apartments were available in a particular complex. His
standing was not at issue before the Court.69 The other two
individual plaintiffs, one black and one white, were testers
hired by HOME to determine whether the defendants engaged
in racial steering. On three occasions, both testers asked about
the availability of apartments in the same area, although they
had no interest in renting apartments there. Each time, the
black tester was told that there were no apartments available;
the white tester was told, accurately, that apartments were
available.7 °
In analyzing whether the testers had standing, the Court
acknowledged that prudential barriers to standing were
inapplicable because Congress intended FHA standing to be
coextensive with Article III's limits.7 Thus, the Havens Court
64. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 1084 (2d ed. 1985).
65. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
67. Havens, 455 U.S. at 366 & n.1.
68. Id. at 367-68.
69. The black plaintiff's claim was not dismissed by the district court, and he
prevailed at trial as a class representative. Id. at 369-70.
70. Id. at 368.
71. Id. at 372; see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109
(1979) (stating that standing under the FHA is coextensive with Article III limits);
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (concluding that the
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determined that the sole requirement for standing to sue under
the FHA was the Article III minimum of injury in fact.72
The Court next examined the FHA's language to decide
whether the testers had standing. It found that Congress con-
ferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about
available housing when it made it unlawful "[tlo represent to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or
rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." 73 The Court
stated that
[t]his congressional intention cannot be overlooked in
determining whether testers have standing to sue. As we
have previously recognized, "[tihe actual or threatened
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of
'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which- creates
standing.... ."' Section 804(d), which, in terms, establishes
an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the
availability of housing, is such an enactment. A tester who
has been the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful
under § 804(d) has suffered injury in precisely the form the
statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has
standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's
provisions.
74
The Court found no support in section 804(d) for the argu-
ment that the testers were not injured because they did not
intend to rent an apartment. Congress did not require in
section 804(d) that a plaintiff have a bona fide interest in
renting or purchasing real estate. Testers who receive false
information have standing to sue under that section.75 The
black tester had standing because she had received false
information. The white tester had no standing because he did
not receive false information. His statutory right to accurate
information concerning the availability of housing was not
violated.76 Since Havens, numerous courts have analyzed the
language of the FHA showed "a congressional intention to define standing as broadly
as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution*).
72. Havens, 455 U.S. at 372.
73. Id. at 373 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976)) (alteration in original).
74. Id. at 373-74 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 374.
76. Id. at 374-75. According to Professor LeBel, the Court erred in concluding that
420
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rights and duties created by the FHA and have concluded that
testers have standing to sue for violations of the rights created
by the statute.7
Congress's power to create statutory rights and duties and to
provide enforcement mechanisms for them includes the power
to create a cause of action for plaintiffs who act to redress
injuries to themselves. Congress also has the power to create
a cause of action for plaintiffs who act in part as private
attorneys general. Prior to Havens, the Court recognized in
the white tester did not have standing as a tester because the defendants' conduct
should be viewed as having inflicted an informational injury on the class of people to
whom the defendant made representations. LeBel, supra note 62, at 1021.
The Havens Court, following its decision in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), concluded that both testers had standing as members of
the community affected by the defendants' racial steering practices. Havens, 455 U.S.
at 377.
The Havens Court also concluded that the organizational plaintiffhad standing. The
organization claimed that it had to devote significant resources to identify and to
counteract the defendants' practices, thereby frustrating its efforts to assist in
establishing equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services.
The Court held that these allegations of injury were sufficient to constitute injury for
standing purposes because they were more than simply allegations of a setback to the
organization's abstract social interests. See id. at 378.
77. E.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,'895 F.2d 1521, 1527 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that testers have standing under § 3604(b) of the FHA, which makes unlawful
"discrimination in the provision of services" in connection with the sale or rental of a
dwelling); see also Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 320, 326-27
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that black testers had standing under the FHA because they
alleged that the defendants made misrepresentations concerning the availability of
houses for inspection because of their race); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc.,
No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9212, at *16, 1987 WL 18,393, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
13, 1987) (holding that testers have the same right to truthful information about
apartment rentals as anyone else and the same rights as anyone else "to 'shop' for
apartments without any particular interest in actually entering into a lease"); Educa-
tion/Instruccion, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ave. Assocs., Civ. Action No. 81-208-MA (D.
Mass. Jan. 6, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (holding that the black testers,
but not the white testers, had standing under the FHA because the black testers
alleged that they were denied the opportunity to view and inspect available residential
property and that they received misinformation).
The lower federal courts have concluded that housing testers discriminated against
on the basis of race have standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination in the sale, lease, or rental of any residential property receiving federal
monies, thereby affirming the right of all citizens to hold and convey property) even
though, unlike the FHA, § 1982 does not create any specific statutory right, such as the
right to receive accurate information about the availability of housing. See, e.g., Watts
v. Boyd Properties, Inc. 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods
Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977); City of Evanston v. Baird &
Warner, Inc., No. 89 C 1098, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15,407, at *3, 1990 WL 186,575,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1990); Gorey & Assocs., 664 F. Supp. at 328; Educa-
tion / Instruccion, Inc., No. 81-208-MA (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
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Pierson v. Ray7" that a plaintiff in a civil rights action may
vindicate a greater societal goal by benefitting nonparties to the
lawsuit. The Court also found that a plaintiff may suffer injury
for Article III purposes even if the plaintiff acted to precipitate
the lawsuit. In Pierson, the plaintiffs, a multiracial group of
clergy on a pilgrimage from New Orleans to Detroit in 1965,
planned in advance to stop in Jackson, Mississippi and to use
the segregated facilities at the interstate bus terminal located
there. They planned to be arrested and jailed. The plaintiffs
were arrested after they tried to enter the restaurant in the
Jackson terminal. They were convicted under a state statute
forbidding congregating and causing a breach of the peace. v9
They subsequently sued the police and presiding judge under
section 1983, but the court of appeals concluded that they were
not entitled to a recovery because they consented to the
defendants' conduct."0 The Supreme Court reversed, explaining
that absent evidence that the plaintiffs "tricked" or "goaded" the
officers into arresting them, the plaintiffs had not consented to
the injury and thus they were entitled to relief.8 ' The Court
held that the plaintiffs had the right to use the waiting room of
the terminal and that exercising that right in a peaceful,
orderly, and inoffensive manner did not disqualify them from
damages under section 1983.82
A plaintiff can vindicate the rights of others by bringing suit
so long as the plaintiff suffered some injury, however slight.8s
78. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
79. Id. at 548-50.
80. Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
81. 386 U.S. at 558.
82. Id. The Court had reached a similar conclusion in Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S.
202 (1958). The plaintiff, a black resident of Memphis, Tennessee, boarded a bus in
Memphis for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring
segregated seating. He left the bus after two police officers instructed him to "go to the
back of the bus, get off, or be arrested." Id. at 203-04 (quoting the district court's
findings). He brought suit seeking a declaration of his and others' right to ride the bus
free from segregated seating arrangements. He also sought an injunction against
enforcement of the statute. A three-judge district court dismissed the case on the
ground that there was no actual controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), because the plaintiff boarded the bus to insti-
tute the litigation and therefore was not representative of a class of black citizens who
used the bus as a means of transportation. Evers, 358 U.S. at 202-03.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the fact that the plaintiff boarded the bus
to institute the litigation was of no significance. Id. at 204. It reasoned that "[a]
resident of a municipality who cannot use [its] transportation facilities . . . without
being subjected . . ..to special disabilities ... [had] a substantial, immediate, and real
interest in the validity of the statute which imposefd] the disability." Id.
83. Justice Brennan noted correctly that "the Constitution draws no distinction
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The Article III judicial power exists to protect against or to
redress injury to the complaining party, even though the court's.
judgment may benefit others collaterally.14  It is not
objectionable that a plaintiff otherwise entitled to enforce a
statutory right or duty wants something beyond personal
vindication. 5 Thus, when interpreting statutory rights or
duties, courts should consider what forms of harm private
enforcement can prevent or cure.
8 6
Acting on behalf of others as a private attorney general has
been approved in the housing discrimination context. In
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,87 the Court
explained that Congress intended private FHA complainants to
"act not only on their own behalf but also 'as private attorneys
general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be
of the highest priority.'" 8 The Court recognized this as an
appropriate exercise of congressional authority.8 9 The Havens
Court came to the same conclusion when it found that a tester
had standing in part because she was serving a purpose beyond
seeking redress for an injury personal to her.9" The tester
vindicated the rights of blacks who wanted to live in an apart-
ment in the area.9' The Havens Court concluded that Congress
intended to permit litigants under the FHA to vindicate their
own rights and the rights of others.92
between injuries that are large, and those that are comparatively small.... The only
distinction that a Constitution guaranteeing justice to all can recognize is one between
some injury and none at all." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 497 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
accord Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 34 n.25 (1975) (holding
that a small injury is sufficient for standing). The magnitude of the injury sustained
by the plaintiff will be relevant to the remedies available to the plaintiff, see infra Part
III, but it should not affect the plaintiff's right to bring the case.
84. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
85. Fletcher, supra note 55, at 242.
86. According to Professor Fletcher, these considerations are the proper content of
the causation and redressability requirements of current Article III standing doctrine
where a federal statutory right is involved. Considering these factors ensures that the
statutory right is interpreted as broadly as intended by Congress. Id.
87. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
88. Id. at 211 (quoting the amicus brief of the Solicitor General).
89. Id. at 209, 211.
90. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982).
91. Fletcher, supra note 55, at 245.
92. Havens, 455 U.S. at 373-74; Fletcher, -supra note 55, at 254 (concluding that
"Congress intended that certain persons not directly injured in a conventional sense be
empowered to enforce those statutory duties" imposed. by the FHA); see also Village of
Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that "Congress created
[the right to be free from misrepresentations] so that private parties could enforce the
423
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Therefore, whether testers93 have standing to sue under Title
VII is a question of statutory interpretation. The answer
depends on the purposes of Title VII, the nature of the rights
Congress created in the statute, and the enforcement scheme
created by Congress, including the class of persons Congress
intended to permit to enforce the statutory rights and duties. 94
The starting point is the statutory language. Congress chose
to permit charges of discrimination under Title VII to be filed
"by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a
member of the [EEOC]. "  The Supreme Court has held that
the use of the "person claiming to be aggrieved" language in the
FHA showed a congressional intent to define standing as
broadly as permitted by Article III.96 Because Title VII and the
FHA are both civil rights acts, Congress probably intended the
same language in the two statutes to have the same meaning.97
The enforcement provisions of Title VII and the FHA are
essentially the same as well.9" Consequently, the courts have
[FHA] as private attorneys general without running afoul of Article III).
93. Many of the tester cases filed to date have been filed on behalf of the
organizations employing the testers as well as on the testers' behalf. See, e.g., supra
notes 5-6. If the organization can show it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's
alleged discriminatory practices, it would have standing under Gladstone and Havens.
See supra note 76.
Moreover, an association has standing to sue in a representational capacity, even if
it has not been injured itself, when: (a) it seeks to represent members who would
otherwise have standing; (b) it seeks to protect interests that are relevant to its
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual
members to participate in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Under the third prong, an association may seek
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of its members, but not damages. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975) (holding that an association may not sue to
recover damages for individual members because establishing "the fact and extent of
injury would require individualized proof," thereby requiring each member who claims
damages to be a party to the lawsuit).
94. The authors of two recent Comments also have argued that testers have
standing to sue under Title VII. See Shannon E. Brown, Comment, Tester Standing
Under Title VII, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1125-33 (1992) (arguing that precedent
and history indicate that testers have standing); Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester
Standing Under Title VII: A Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 1217,
1258-68 (1992) (proposing that the policies underlying both Title VII and federal
standing doctrine support tester standing).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
96. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 (1979); Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972).
97. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
915 (1978).
98. Under both statutes, private parties are permitted to file suit in district court
to enforce the statutory rights and duties. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988) (Title VII); id.
§ 3613(a) (FHA). Both statutes provide for an administrative phase prior to adversarial
424
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recognized uniformly that Congress intended standing under
Title VII to be construed as broadly as permitted by Article
III. 99
Broadly defining the class of persons permitted to sue to
redress violations of Title VII is consistent with the ambitious
purpose of the statute-to eradicate discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
To accomplish the complementary purpose of eradicating
discrimination in housing, Congress intended standing to be
interpreted broadly under the FHA. °° The Ninth Circuit
properly rejected the argument that standing under Title VII
should be interpreted more narrowly than under the FHA.'0 '
The court concluded that standing should be granted generously
judicial proceedings, in which the responsible agency is charged with attempting to
resolve the dispute through conciliation and mediation. Under the FHA the
administrative phase is optional; under Title VII it is mandatory. See id. § 3610(a)-(b)
(FHA); § 2000e-5(b) (Title VII). Unlike the FHA, which was amended only recently to
give HUD the power to try cases before an administrative law judge, Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, sec. 8, § 812(b), 102 Stat. 1619, 1629
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1988)), and to give the Attorney General the power to
try cases in federal court, id. sec. 8, § 814(a), 102 Stat. at 1634 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3614(a) (1988)), Title VII gives the EEOC the power to file charges in its own name,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988) (providing that charges may be filed "by a member of the
Commission'). The provision giving the EEOC this power was added to the statute in
1972 to expand the coverage of Title VII and to increase compliance. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. There is no
suggestion in the language or history of this provision that Congress intended to
narrow the class of plaintiffs who could sue under Title VII. Thus, this power of public
enforcement provides no basis for interpreting the 'person claiming to be aggrieved"
language more narrowly in Title VII than in the FHA. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d
846, 849 (7th Cir. 1982); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 453; Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d
466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
99. See, e.g., Stewart, 675 F.2d at 849; EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477,
482-83 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 453;
Waters, 547 F.2d at 489; Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971).
100. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
101. Waters, 547 F.2d at 469. The Third Circuit likewise read Congressional intent
correctly when it stated,
The national policy reflected.., in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of
standing or election of remedies. If the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that
he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in the
Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue ....
Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446-47; see also Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 388 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (arguing that public policy
requires that "standing be interlreted as liberally as Article III permits in Title VII...
actions").
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under both statutes because "[tihe distinction between laws
aimed at desegregation and laws aimed at equal [employment]
opportunity is illusory."" 2
As discussed earlier, the question whether a tester claims
sufficient injury to raise a genuine case or controversy depends
on whether the tester can allege that her rights under Title VII
have been violated or that the defendant breached a duty owed
to her under the statute.'0 3 "The policy [expressed in Title VII],
of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in employment
practices."'O° The provisions defining prohibited acts should be
given "a liberal construction in order to carry out the purposes
of Congress to eliminate... unfairness, and the humiliation of
discrimination."' 5 The provisions defining unlawful discrimi-
nation have been interpreted to prohibit acts that have either
the purpose or the effect of discriminating on the basis of a
prohibited classification.
10 6
The language of Title VII illuminates congressional intent.
Congress defined acts of employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations that are "unlawful employment practices"
in section 2000e-2.'0 7 These provisions reflect comprehensive
legislative intent to proscribe employment discrimination.
Under section 2000e-2(a)(1), it is unlawful for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
102. Waters, 547 F.2d at 469.
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1103 (1983); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977).
105. Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858, 861 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); accord Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560
F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977). Title VII's legislative history indicates that Congress intended
that the courts interpret discrimination broadly. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964)
(Interpretive memorandum of Title VII by Sens. Clark and Case, the bill's floor
managers) (defining discrimination as making a distinction or a difference in treatment
or favor); see also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1973).
106. For example, Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination and, under the
disparate impact rubric, the use of neutral employment practices that have an adverse
impact on members of a protected class. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
(1971); see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). Moreover, in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(c)(3) (1988), Congress prohibited "attempts" by a labor organization to cause
an employer to discriminate, even if no discrimination results.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1988).
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origin.""' There is no language that suggests that an applicant
for employment must have a bona fide interest in employment
to have a right to be considered for the job on equal terms with
other applicants. In fact, to make out a prima facie case of
discriminatory refusal to hire, a plaintiff need not show that
she would have accepted the job if it were offered.'0 9 The fact
that the plaintiff would not have accepted a job offer might
affect the remedies available, but it is not relevant to the
standing issue. Put simply, under section 2000e-2(a)(1), an
individual has the right to be considered for employment
without regard to race, sex, or any other forbidden characteris-
tic, and an employer has a corresponding duty to consider all
applicants without regard to those characteristics.
In section 2000e-2(a)(2), Congress defined this right and duty
more explicitly. That section makes it unlawful for an employer
"to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."" °
Thus, the statute grants all applicants the right to be
considered for employment on their merits, whether or not they
intend to accept a job offer. Just as the FHA grants all
individuals the right to shop for apartments free from
discrimination, Title VII grants individuals a similar right to
"shop" for a job, even if they are only "window shopping.""'
Testers have standing to enforce this right."
2
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). "
109. To make out a prima facie discrimination case under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that: 1) she was a member of a protected class, 2) she applied for and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, 3) she was rejected,
and 4) the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with the plaintiffs
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
111. Cf. Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9212, at *16, 1987 WL 18,393, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987).
112. Testers also have standing to sue employment agencies that for discriminatory
reasons refuse to refer them for employment. It is unlawful for an employment agency
"to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or
refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988). Under Title VII, an individual's right
to be considered for referral on an equal basis with others in no way depends on
whether the individual has a bona fide interest in ultimately accepting an offer of
employment. The provisions prohibiting discrimination by labor organizations are
similarly broad and make no reference to the individual's intent to accept union
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That a tester's injury may be less severe than the injury
suffered by an individual with an actual interest in employment
is insignificant. Unlawful discrimination under Title VII is by
definition "class discrimination."" 3 "[Cilaims under Title VII
involve the vindication of a major public interest, and.. . any
action under [Title VIII involves considerations beyond those
raised by the individual claimant.""4  Therefore, "in the
enforcement process of Title VII ... [tihe private litigant not
only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices."" 5  By providing attorneys' fees to prevailing
plaintiffs, "Congress intended to facilitate the bringing of
discrimination complaints." "6 By permitting Title VII plaintiffs
to act as private attorneys general vindicating an important
public policy, Congress anticipated that these plaintiffs would
represent the interests of individuals not before the court.
Because testers who receive disparate treatment on the basis
of race, sex, or some other prohibited characteristic suffer some
injury under Title VII, they have standing to sue in order to
vindicate the interests of individuals not before the court.
membership or to work for an employer after referral by the union. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(c) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
Id.
113. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,
887 (C.D. Cal.), modified on other grounds, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1019 (C.D.
Cal. 1976) (quoting Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1973)).
114. Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 967 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting
S. CONF. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATWVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1847 (1972)).
115. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1973).
116. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980); see also
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978); Kennedy v.
Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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The only court to address the question of tester standing
under Title VII ruled that two black testers who were denied
referrals by an employment agency had standing to sue that
agency under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988), which makes it
unlawful for an employment agency "to fail or refuse to refer for
employment ... any individual because of his race."117 The
court correctly ruled that the section creates a right to
nondiscriminatory referrals. The tester plaintiffs claimed that
the agency violated that right, an injury sufficient to confer
standing on the testers.1 18  The court noted, however, that
testers would not have standing to sue an employer for
discriminatory failure to hire, because testers do not actually
seek a job and could not be injured by a failure to hire. 119 This
analysis is incorrect. As discussed, there is no textual support
in Title VII for the conclusion that an applicant for employment
has a right to nondiscriminatory treatment only if that
applicant has a bona fide interest in a job with the defendant
employer.12
III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION TESTERS
The current EEOC position is to wait for charges to be filed
by private groups or individuals who engage in testing. This
approach is problematic because it is unlikely to fill the
enforcement void identified in Part I. First, private parties are
not obligated to limit the use of testers to the context of hiring
for lower-skilled, entry-level positions.'2 ' Second, under current
117. Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., Inc., 1993 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 118, at E-1 (D.D.C. June 22, 1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988))
(emphasis added by the Fair Employment Council court).
118. Id. at E-1 to E-2.
119. Id. at E-2.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12; cf. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301 (1993)
(holding that when the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of a group to obtain a benefit, a member of that group need not show that she
would have obtained the benefit in order to have standing-, the denial of equal
treatment itself constitutes injury).
121. There probably is no enforcement void in the context of hiring for higher-
skilled, upper-level positions. See supra Part I. Testers should not be permitted to
intrude unnecessarily into employers' hiring practices for such positions.
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law, insufficient remedies are available to encourage private
tester litigation. The remedies available are discussed in this
Part. Also, as discussed in Part IV, state common-law causes
of action and attorney disciplinary rules might be used against
testers and their counsel to deter the practice.
A. Attorneys' Fees and the Supreme Court
Because many civil rights attorneys rely on statutory fee
awards to earn a living, testing may be underused if attorneys
representing testers cannot recover their fees.'22 Under recent
Supreme Court decisions, a victorious plaintiff is a "prevailing
party" for purposes of the attorneys' fees provisions of Title VII
only if the plaintiff obtains relief that materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's
behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Moreover,
when the plaintiff's success is purely technical or de minimis,
no fees can be recovered. These restrictions on fee awards may
deter the use of testers.
The standards for recovery of attorneys' fees under Title VII
are analogous to those under other federal civil rights statutes.
Title VII provides that "[iin any action or proceeding . . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." 23 In the Civil Rights
Attorneys Fees Act of 1976 (section 1988),124 Congress used
identical language to provide for an award of attorneys' fees
under other civil rights statutes. 125 Thus, decisions interpreting
122. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 758 & n.13, 760, 766 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that civil rights practitioners must be concerned with earning a
living, and that "[t]he congressional policy underlying the Fees Acts is ... to create
incentives for lawyers to devote time to civil rights cases by making it economically
feasible for them to do so"); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (stating that [i]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own
attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public
interest" and asserting that "Congress... enacted the provision for counsel fees... to
encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief").
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
125. Section 1988 provides that "fi]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986... the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." Id. § 1988(b).
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section 1988 generally govern interpretation of Title VII's
attorneys' fees provision.
126
Recent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted section
1988 restrictively. In Rhodes v. Stewart,127 the Court extended
its ruling in Hewitt v. Helms,128 which held that "a favorable
judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results
in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice to render [the
plaintiff] a 'prevailing party.'"'29 The Rhodes Court ruled that
plaintiffs who succeeded on their claims but obtained
declaratory relief which had no prospective effect were not
prevailing parties. 3 ° In Rhodes, plaintiffs Reese and Stewart,
who both were incarcerated, filed a complaint in January 1978
alleging that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated by prison officials who refused them permission
to subscribe to a magazine. Reese died in 1979, and Stewart
was released on parole in early 1980.' Nevertheless, in 1981
the district court ruled that correctional officers had not applied
the proper standards in denying the request for the subscription
and ordered the prison officials to comply with those
126. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983).
127. 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
128. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
129. Id. at 763. In Hewitt, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff, a prison
inmate, showed that his due process rights were violated when a prison hearing
committee found him guilty of misconduct on the basis of hearsay evidence and
sentenced him to six months of restrictive confinement. Id. at 757. On remand, the
defendants established an immunity defense, and the district court granted summary
judgment in their favor. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 758-59. Helms had
petitioned the district court on remand for attorneys' fees under § 1988, even though
judgment had been entered against him. Id. at 759. The district court denied the
request, but the court of appeals reversed, stating that its earlier determination that
Helms's due process rights were violated made Helms a prevailing party. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
[iun order to be eligible for attorney's fees under § 1988, a litigant must be a
'prevailing party.' Whatever the outer boundaries of that term may be, Helms
does not fit within them. Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff
receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to
prevail.... Helms obtained no relief. Because of the defendants' official
immunity he received no damages award. No injunction or declaratory judgment
was entered in his favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without benefit of a formal
judgment-for example, through a consent decree or settlement.... The most
that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have
been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. That is not the stuff of
which legal victories are made.
Id. at 759-60 (citations omitted).
130. Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4.
131. Id. at 2-3.
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standards. 3 2 The district court then awarded attorneys' fees to
the plaintiffs,'33 which the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning
that Stewart and Rhodes had obtained a declaratory judgment,
making them prevailing parties for purposes of section 1988.134
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "[a]Ithough the
plaintiff in Hewitt had not won a declaratory judgment, nothing
in our opinion suggested that the entry of such a judgment in
a party's favor automatically renders that party prevailing
under § 1988."135 The Court further ruled that a declaratory
judgment
constitute[s] relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it
affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plain-
tiff.... A modification of prison policies on magazine sub-
scriptions could not in any way have benefited either
plaintiff, one of whom was dead and the other released
before the District Court entered its order.
136
Thus, under Rhodes, the plaintiff must do more than win a
lawsuit to be a prevailing party.I17
Thereafter, in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indepen-
dent School District,'38 the Court held that to be a prevailing
party the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the
dispute that changes the legal relationship between the
parties.139  The plaintiff teachers brought suit under section
1983 against the school district and its officials challenging
various school district policies restricting communications
concerning employee organizations. After succeeding on some
but not all of their claims, the plaintiffs sought fees in the
district court.140 The district court denied the fee request on the
ground that the plaintiffs had not succeeded on the "central
issue" in the litigation.'4 ' The court of appeals affirmed.
14
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover fees because the district court's order
132. Id. at 1-2.
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. at 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
139. Id. at 792.
140. Id. at 785-87.
141. Id. at 787-88.
142. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 837 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
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"materially altered the school district's policy limiting the rights
of teachers to communicate with each other concerning em-
ployee organizations and union activities.""4 Therefore, the
teachers were able to point to a resolution of the dispute that
changed the defendants' conduct towards them.1" On the other
hand, the Court stated that if the plaintiff's success was "purely
technical or de minimis," a district court would be justified in
denying a fee request.
145
Until the Court's decision three years later in Farrar v.
Hobby,'46 it appeared to be a reasonable reading of Garland
that the "de minimis or technical victory" exception was "a
second barrier to prevailing party status."4 7  In Farrar,
however, the Court ruled that this exception is part of the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee. 1 4  The
plaintiffs in Farrar brought an action seeking seventeen million
dollars in damages against the lieutenant governor of Texas
and others under sections 1983 and 1985, alleging that the
plaintiffs were deprived of liberty and property without due
process when the state closed a school for delinquent, disabled,
and disturbed teens that the plaintiffs owned and operated.
149
The district court entered judgment for the lieutenant governor
after a jury concluded that although he committed an act under
color of law that deprived one of the plaintiffs of a civil right,
that conduct was not a proximate cause of any damages. 50 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the jury's finding required
an award of nominal damages to the plaintiff,'5 ' and on remand
the district court additionally awarded the plaintiff $280,000 in
attorneys' fees.'52 The Fifth Circuit reversed the fee award,
relying on Hewitt, Rhodes, and Garland.'53
The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the award of
nominal damages made the plaintiffs prevailing parties because
"[a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether
compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for
143. 489 U.S. at 793.
144. Id. at 792.
145. Id. at 792-93.
146. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
147. Id. at 576 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 570-71.
150. Id. at 570.
151. Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985).
152. 113 S. Ct. at 570.
153. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1991), affd sub nom.
Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
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the plaintiffs' benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount
of money he otherwise would not pay.""54 Nevertheless, the
Court stated that a prevailing plaintiff should receive no
attorneys' fees at all if the nature of the relief did not justify
the award.'55 The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's conclusion
that no fee award was appropriate because, in a civil rights suit
for damages, the award of nominal damages highlights the
plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury and shows
that the plaintiffs achieved little beyond the "'moral satisfaction
of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had
been violated' in some unspecified way."'56 As Justice O'Connor
observed, whether the Garland technical or de minimis
standard is a barrier to prevailing party status or is part of the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee is irrelevant
to the final outcome: "When the plaintiff's success is purely
technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded." 57
Thus, under Hewitt, Rhodes, Garland, and Farrar, a tester
must satisfy a two-part test to recover attorneys' fees under
Title VII. First, a tester must obtain actual relief on the merits
of the claim that materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a
way that directly benefits the tester. Second, the relief must be
more than de minimis or purely technical. The remaining
subparts of this Part discuss why private testers are unlikely to
recover fees under this test.
B. Injunctive Relief
Title VII authorizes courts to grant successful plaintiffs
equitable relief that would be sufficient to support a fee award.
If a court finds a defendant has violated Title VII,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
154. 113 S. Ct. at 574.
155. See id. at 575; Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1991); Stefan
v. Laurenitis, 889 F.2d 363, 369 (1st Cir. 1989).
156. 113 S. Ct. at 574 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987)).
157. Id. at 576 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate.'58
An employment discrimination tester would not be entitled to
reinstatement or back pay because a tester would not have
accepted a job offer from the defendant. 5 9  Therefore, the
question is whether a tester can obtain an injunction forbidding
future unlawful employment practices, perhaps including an
order requiring an employer to change its hiring practices, or
"other equitable relief" sufficient to support a fee award. 60
Testers may not be able to obtain injunctive relief for
violations of their rights under Title VII. When there is a
danger of future harm, the court's power to grant an injunction
survives the cessation of the illegal conduct that forms the basis
of the suit,'6 ' and most courts that have considered the question
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988). This section consistently has been interpreted
to permit only equitable remedies for violations of Title VII. E.g., Wilson v. City of
Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 1986); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 642
F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. Utility Workers
Union v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). In addition, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded to a successful plaintiff. See infra
Part III.E.
159. Courts have ruled consistently, in Title VII actions, that a plaintiff who
voluntarily ceases employment with the defendant is not entitled to an order requiring
the defendant to employ the individual. Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that where a Title VII plaintiff alleges that his reassignment was
motivated by racial discrimination but does not contest his subsequent discharge, he
may not obtain an order requiring his reinstatement); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr.,
671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that a plaintiffwho left the defendant's
employ voluntarily during the pendency of a Title VII discrimination action was not
entitled to back pay or reinstatement); Ahn v. Turnage, No. C-87-2433 RHS, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14,307, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1991) (holding that a plaintiff who left
the defendant's employ and had no viable constructive discharge claim was not entitied
to back pay or reinstatement); EEOC v. Red Baron Steak Houses, 47 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 49 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying reinstatement to a plaintiff discharged in
violation of Title VII because she voluntarily took herself out of the work force). It
seems logical that a plaintiff who never intended to work for the defendant also would
be ineligible for such relief.
160. An injunction prohibiting future violations of Title VII would not be
superfluous even though Title VII already prohibits the conduct. The injunction would
deter future violations because the defendant would be subject to the court's contempt
power if it violated the statute. The injunction also would send a signal to employers
and others that the court is protecting rights to equal employment opportunity. In
cases involving retaliation, an injunction may be necessary to assure employees that
they are entitled to exercise the rights granted by Title VII. Berkman v. City of New
York, 705 F.2d 584, 597 (2d Cir. 1983); see generally United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1953) (holding that the purpose of an injunction is to prevent
future violations of the law).
161. Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 325 (5th Cir.
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have stated that an employer found liable for discriminating in
violation of Title VII may be enjoined from committing future
acts of discrimination unless there is no reasonable expectation
that the employer will discriminate in the future. 6 2 Courts are
reluctant, however, to interfere with an employer's operation
and often conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that
an employer will discriminate in the future unless the record
contains evidence of widespread, pervasive discrimination.
6 3
1984); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d 1367, 1370 (1lth Cir. 1982).
162. See, e.g., Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 640 (1991); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989); EEOC
v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1544-45 (9th Cir. 1987); Walls, 730 F.2d
at 325; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rochon v. FBI, 691
F. Supp. 1548, 1553 (D.D.C. 1988); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 277
(N.D. Tex. 1987); cf City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d at 1370-71 (noting that in cases
presenting abundant evidence of consistent past discrimination, injunctive relief is
mandatory absent clear and convincing proof that there is no reasonable probability of
further noncompliance with the law); Harmond v. Cavazos, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 142, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1991). Contra Berkman, 705 F.2d at 595 (holding that relief
designed to assure compliance with Title VII in the future is "appropriate whenever a
Title VII violation [is] found, irrespective of any history of prior discriminatory practices
or the intent of the defendant").
163. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1519. In Hacienda Hotel, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
the curative steps taken by the defendant during litigation were insufficient assurances
of future compliance with Title VII, where the defendant committed multiple Title VII
violations and did not act promptly in response to complaints of sexual harassment.
Id.
In Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990), the court held that a
plaintiff who prevailed in a hostile-environment sexual harassment case was not
entitled to an injunction where the defendant had adopted an antiharassment policy
and fired the offending supervisor, where there was no evidence of systemic company-
wide discrimination and where an injunction would discourage employers from
voluntarily complying with Title VII after suit is filed. Id. at 660-61. In Johnson v.
Brock, 810 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the plaintiff proved that he was discriminated
against in promotions and that the supervisors who discriminated against him were
still with the company. Id. at 226. The court held, however, that absent evidence of
animus toward the plaintiff and callous disregard of the plaintiff's rights, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that discrimination would continue in the future. The court
believed that a judgment in the plaintiff's favor had sufficiently impressed upon the
defendant the need to exercise greater care in administering its employment policies.
Id.; see also Walls, 730 F.2d at 325 (holding that the mere possibility of a recurrent
violation is insufficient to obtain an injunction, but that instead a cognizable danger is
required); Harmond, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 143 (holding that a plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction forbidding future discrimination because the person who
retaliated against the plaintiffs exercise of Title VII rights was no longer with the
company); EEOC v. General Lines Inc., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 953, 955 (D.
Wyo. 1986) (holding that although plaintiffs were discharged in retaliation for
exercising Title VII rights they were not entitled to an injunction because there was no
evidence that the defendant continued to engage in unlawful employment practices),
aff'd, 865 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Financial Assurance, Inc., 624 F. Supp.
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Thus, testers would not be entitled to injunctive relief unless
the evidence obtained through testing, a subsequent EEOC
investigation, or discovery after suit was filed, revealed
widespread discrimination.
Even if testers can meet this evidentiary burden, most courts
likely will deny testers' requests for injunctive relief because
testers have no interest in employment with the defendant and
thus do not meet the "personal benefits" requirement for
injunctive relief. Courts consistently have ruled that individu-
als who prove that they were discriminated against in violation
of Title VII may not obtain injunctive relief if they are not
employees of the defendant or likely to become employees
because such individuals will not personally benefit from any
change in the employer's practices. For example, most courts
have ruled that a plaintiff who proves that he worked in a
sexually hostile environment but who voluntarily left employ-
ment with the defendant is not entitled to an injunction
forbidding future harassment because the injunction would not
personally affect his rights."6
686, 695 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that where the defendant has not indulged in any
similar discrimination in the past and there was no evidence that it was likely to do so
in the future, there was nothing to be gained by ordering injunctive relief); Smith v.
Flesh Co., 512 F. Supp. 46, 53 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction where there was no evidence that the defendant was
discriminating against women at the time of trial).
164. E.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that
an employee who was sexually harassed and who left employment with the defendant
and did not seek reinstatement was unlikely to obtain an injunction to restrain
practices that injured her in the past but no longer affected her); Abrams v. Tisch, 50
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 863, 864-65 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that a plaintiffwho
was sexually harassed but voluntarily quit employment was not entitled to an
injunction because it could not affect her rights).
The courts have applied this principle in other contexts as well. See Beattie v.
United States, 949 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiffwhose
promotional opportunities allegedly were impeded in violation of Title VII was not
entitled to injunctive relief even if he proved his case because by voluntarily quitting
he could not prove that he was likely to be injured by the defendant in the future);
Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a plaintiff who sued for discrimination in wages, hiring, and promotion was not
entitled to an injunction ordering the defendant not to engage in racially discriminatory
hiring practices because the plaintiff did not seek reinstatement and did not show any
other way he would personally benefit from the requested relief); Backus v. Baptist
Medical Ctr., 671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff who was
illegally denied a transfer is not entitled to an injunction where he later quit his job
voluntarily, thereby removing himself from the impact of the practice); Miller v. Texas
State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.) (holding that injunctive
relief is not appropriate where the plaintiff was discriminated against in job
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In short, to obtain an injunction under prevailing law, the
plaintiff must be part of the class that would benefit from such
relief.'65 Under the rationale of these cases, tester plaintiffs
will not be able to obtain injunctive relief, even with proof of
widespread discrimination.'66 Therefore, absent some other
form of relief that materially alters the relationship of the
parties and is more than de minimis or technical, successful
testers will not be entitled to attorneys' fees.
assignments but was discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
891 (1980); McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding
that a plaintiff's request to enjoin future harassment is moot where the plaintiff is no
longer employed by the defendant); Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a plaintiff no longer employed is not entitled to injunctive relief);
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that the
plaintiff, who was subjected to a religiously hostile environment but was discharged for
nondiscriminatory reasons, was not entitled to an injunction because he was no longer
employed by the defendant and the case was not prosecuted as a class action).
This analysis is somewhat inconsistent, however, with the courts' treatment of Title
VII injunctions in other contexts. For example, courts have held that an individual who
works for an employer after proving she was denied a job in violation of Title VII can
obtain an injunction affecting the employer's hiring practices although she would not
be among the class of persons affected by the injunction. E.g., Taylor v. USAir, Inc., 56
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 357, 366 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
165. E.g., Carmichael, 738 F.2d at 1136 (stating that although an injunction may
benefit nonparties, the class benefitted by the injunction must include the plaintiff).
The decisions denying injunctive relief to nonemployee plaintiffs ignore Congress's
purpose in empowering Title VII plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general
vindicating both their own rights and the rights of others. Congress authorized Title
VII plaintiffs to litigate in the public interest and recognized that Title VII violations,
which involve class-based discrimination, often warrant class-based relief. The
decisions denying injunctive relief to nonemployee plaintiffs focus solely on the
relationship between the particular plaintiff and the defendant employer.
166. Testers also would not be permitted to serve in a class action suit as represen-
tatives of a class of applicants with a bona fide interest in employment with the
defendant. The Supreme Court has prohibited "across the board" class actions in Title
VII cases. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)
(holding that three Mexican-American drivers who were not qualified for promotion to
line-driver positions could not represent a class of black and Mexican-American city
drivers who were denied promotions because a class representative must be part of the
class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members); see
also General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (holding that a plain-
tiff alleging discrimination in promotions cannot maintain a class action on behalf of
individuals claiming discrimination in hiring).
Under these decisions, testers would not represent adequately the interests of a class
of individuals with a bona fide interest in employment because they do not have the
same interest or suffer the same injury as the class members. Moreover, if there was
evidence to support class allegations in hiring, counsel likely would be able to locate a
class representative who had an interest in employment with the defendant and would
not need a tester to act as a plaintiff.
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C. Declaratory Relief
A declaratory judgment is an equitable remedy that estab-
lishes the legal rights of parties where those rights have been
questioned, threatened, disputed, or violated."7 Courts have
recognized that declaratory relief potentially is appropriate in
Title VII cases. 6 ' A plaintiff who obtains a declaration that her
right to be free from discrimination under Title VII was
violated wins the satisfaction of prevailing in court. Further,
it is in the public interest that a denial of employment
opportunities be labeled a violation of Title VII.'69
In light of these purposes, courts should be more willing to
award declaratory relief for a violation of Title VII than to issue
an injunction, which may interfere with the operation of an
employer's business. For example, some courts appear willing
to award declaratory relief without considering whether the
employer's discriminatory practices are widespread or whether
the employer is likely to violate Title VII in the future. 7 °
Courts may require, however, that there be evidence that
similar discriminatory conduct will recur before they will issue
a declaratory judgment.' 7 '
Inexplicably, many courts have ruled that declaratory relief
is not available to a Title VII plaintiff who no longer works for
the employer, cannot show a likelihood of doing so, and does not
represent a class.'72 There is no apparent justification for this
167. EDwIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 7 (2d ed. 1941).
168. See Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 461 F. Supp. 160, 173 (W.D. Pa.
1978); Wright v. St. John's Hosp., 414 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D. Okla. 1976).
169. See Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 1974);
Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 644 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
170. See, e.g., Bua v. County of San Diego, 731 F. Supp. 962, 964 (S.D. Cal. 1990)
(holding that a plaintiff who was denied promotions because of his race is entitled to
a declaration that the defendant's promotion practices were discriminatory), rev'd, 953
F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992); Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(stating that declaratory relief may be available to a plaintiff in a hostile-environment
sexual harassment case).
171. See Williams, 492 F.2d at 406; Wright, 414 F. Supp. at 1208.
172. Ahn v. Turnage, No. C-87-2433 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,307 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 1991) (stating that a plaintiff who allegedly was sexually harassed, left
defendant's employment, and had no viable constructive discharge claim is not entitled
to declaratory relief if successful because there is no chance that she would be employed
again by the defendant); Abrams v. Tisch, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 863, 864
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who was harassed because of race but who
voluntarily left employment was not entitled to declaratory relief because the relief
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restriction because, although a declaratory judgment may have
some salutary class-wide effects, the remedy is personal to the
plaintiff, serving simply as a determination that the defendant
violated the plaintiff's rights. Other courts, recognizing this
function of a declaratory remedy, freely grant declaratory relief
to a plaintiff who no longer is employed by the defendant in
order to give the plaintiff the satisfaction of succeeding on her
claim.'7 3 Because there is no unanimity on this issue, it is by
no means clear that testers who prove they were discriminated
against in violation of Title VII will be able to obtain a declara-
tion that their rights to be free from discrimination were
violated.
Even if a tester obtained declaratory relief, that relief would
not support a fee award because the declaration would not
affect the future behavior of the defendant towards the tester.1
74
The declaration that the defendant violated the tester's rights
would not affect the plaintiff's rights); Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1229, 1242
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration that the
defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex in denying her a promotion
where she later left the defendant's employ voluntarily because the "plaintiff ha[d]
shown no desire to reenlist, and... [did] not represent a class"); Compston v. Borden,
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that a plaintiff subjected to a
religiously hostile environment but discharged for a nondiscriminatory reason was not
entitled to declaratory relief because the plaintiff was no longer an employee, the action
was not a class action, and there were no continuing adverse effects of the harassment).
173. Mitchell, 629 F. Supp. at 644 (holding that a plaintiff who was sexually
harassed but who voluntarily left employment with the defendant was not entitled to
injunctive relief because she no longer worked for the defendant, but was entitled to
declaratory relief because she was entitled to the satisfaction of proving harassment
and prevailing in her day in court); cf. Snow v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 582 F. Supp.
53, 61, 64 (D. Nev. 1984) (holding that where the plaintiff was discriminated against
on the basis of her sex while employed by the defendant but was justifiably discharged,
declaratory relief was appropriate because without specifically labeling the employer's
acts as violations of Title VII there was no reasonable assurance that the same or
similar conduct would not be repeated in the future); Fisher v. Dillard Univ., 499 F.
Supp. 525, 536 (E.D. La. 1980) (holding that a plaintiff who was discriminated against
in salary and discharged because of her race but did not seek reinstatement was
entitled to declaratory relief because there was a controversy sufficient to adjudicate
the case and the plaintiff's future employment opportunities might be adversely
affected without clarification of the reasons for her discharge).
174. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) ("A declaratory judgment... will
constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff."); cf. Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370, 1372, 1375
(8th Cir. 1991) (stating that ajury finding that the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights
were violated does not support a fee award where no damages were awarded), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 111 (1992); Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 847
(U1th Cir. 1991) (stating that a jury finding that the plaintiff was subjected to sexual
harassment does not support a fee award where the plaintiff was not constructively
discharged and was not otherwise entitled to any backpay award), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1043 (1993).
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perhaps would deter future violations of Title VII, but it would
not force the defendant to act in a way that would affect the
defendant's future relationship with the tester.
D. Nominal Damages
Testers also might be able to recover nominal damages, but
these damages will not support a fee award.
Common-law courts traditionally ... vindicated depriva-
tions of certain "absolute" rights that are not shown to have
caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum
of money. By making the deprivation of such rights
actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual
injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized
society that those rights be scrupulously observed .... "'
Congress has stated that eradicating discrimination in
employment is a national priority of the highest order.'76 Thus,
an award of nominal damages would be appropriate for a Title
VII plaintiff, including a tester, who is not entitled to damages
but who proves that the defendant discriminated against him
in violation of the statute.
177
175. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (footnote omitted) (holding that
defendant's violation of due process rights demanded an award of nominal damages "not
to exceed one dollar").
176. S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964); H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, at 1-2; see also
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
177. Prior to the 1991 amendments to Title VII permitting awards of compensatory
damages for violations of Title VII, see infra note 180 and accompanying text, courts
that considered awards of nominal damages under Title VII had to address whether
nominal damages are equitable or legal. Because Title VII authorized only equitable
relief, courts that determined that nominal damages are compensatory did not award
nominal damages. The courts that considered the issue split on whether nominal
damages are equitable or legal. Compare, e.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff who proved that she was demoted because of
her sex was entitled to nominal damages regardless of how the court ruled on her
constructive discharge claim) with, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1147-48
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff who was harassed was not entitled to nominal
damages because such damages are not equitable). The question of whether nominal
damages are equitable or legal relief appears to be moot after the 1991 amendments to
Title VII because both equitable relief and compensatory damages are now available.
See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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In Farrar v. Hobby, however, the Supreme Court ruled that
while an award of nominal damages satisfied the prevailing
party standard, the award was technical or de minimis relief,
which usually would not merit a fee recovery. 178 Such an award
vindicates the plaintiffs rights but does not force the defendant
employer to do anything to alter its relationship with the
plaintiff. As with declaratory judgments, there may be
collateral benefits to employees of the defendant company, to
future applicants, or to the community at large, but the Farrar
majority did not concern itself with those collateral benefits
when interpreting the fee statutes. 179  Thus, a recovery of
nominal damages likely would not entitle testers to an award
of attorneys' fees.
E. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress authorized
prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII actions to recover compensatory
and punitive damages. 80  The tester cases successfully
178. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992). For a discussion of Farrar, see
supra text accompanying notes 146-57.
179. In her concurrence, however, Justice O'Connor wrote that an award of nominal
damages might support a reasonable fee award. She suggested that the courts should
consider the difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought, the
significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose
served. If such factors suggest that the plaintiff's victory was not de minimis, a court
could award fees. Id. at 576 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under O'Connor's reasoning,
testers might be entitled to attorneys' fees if they recover nominal damages.
180. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, provides:
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII] against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination[,J ... provided
that the complaining party cannot recover under [42 U.S.C. § 1981, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in employment], the complaining
party may recover compensatory and punitive damages ... in addition to any
relief authorized by [§ 2000e-5(g) of Title VII] from the respondent.
Id. tit. I, § 102, at 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. 1991)). Compensatory
damages do not include backpay, interest on backpay, or other relief already available
under § 2000e-5(g) of Title VII, but may be awarded for "future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2), (3). The amount of punitive and
compensatory damages allowable is fixed according to a schedule based on the size of
a defendant's workforce. The maximum amounts allowable range from $50,000 to
$300,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(C).
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prosecuted under the FHA, which also permits awards of
compensatory and punitive damages, suggest that testers are
likely to recover only modest amounts,' which may not be
sufficient to support a fee award.
Punitive damages are awardable under the amendments to
Title VII only where "the complaining party demonstrates that
the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discrim-
inatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to
the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."'82
District courts in two housing discrimination cases brought by
testers concluded that punitive damages were awardable
regardless of the effects of the discrimination because the
defendants intentionally discriminated against the testers. l 3
By definition, Title VII disparate treatment cases involve
intentional discrimination.'8" Therefore, testers may be able to
convince the fact finder that an award of punitive damages
would be appropriate, particularly where there is evidence of
widespread discrimination. In two representative FHA cases,
however, the courts awarded only $1000 in punitive damages
to each tester plaintiff.'85 The number of tester plaintiffs in a
181. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). One of the few courts interpreting the
punitive damages provisions of the amendments, however, has noted that there appears
to be no difference between the standard for establishing a right to punitive damages
and the standard for establishing liability for disparate treatment. Thus, according to
the court, the standard is more lenient than under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Stender v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1992). However, in Koppman v. South
Central Bell Telephone Co., 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,665 (E.D. La. 1992), the
court adopted the prevailing standard for punitive damages under § 1981-callous or
malicious conduct. Id. at 71,820.
183. City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., No. 88-C9695, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4435, at *6, 1991 WL 55,770, at *3 (N.D. 11. Apr. 8, 1991), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 982 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the award of punitive
damages against parties which actively discriminated against testers); Davis v.
Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
184. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff has the "ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
185. Matchmaker Real Estate, No. 88-C-9695, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8, 1991 WL
at *3 (awarding each of 19 testers $1000); Davis, 597 F. Supp. at 347 (awarding each
of two testers $1000). In a recent case involving employment discrimination testers, a
jury awarded each of two tester plaintiffs $10,000 in punitive damages. However, the
facts were particularly egregious. During the testers' interviews, the owner of the
defendant employment service offered to waive the application fee in exchange for sex.
See Jury Awards $79,000 in Tester Case, Fair Employment Pracs.: Summary Latest
Devs. (BNA), Aug. 30, 1993, at 98.
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particular case would have to be large to result in a significant
punitive damages award.
Additionally, testers could be compensated for emotional
distress and humiliation. One court awarded compensatory
damages of $250 to one housing tester and $300 to another,
"tak[ing] into account the fact that the testers were being paid
[a modest sum]."186 Where the tester plaintiffs concentrate on
creating a good record to support an award of compensatory
damages, a court or jury may be more generous. One district
court awarded $5000 for emotional distress and humiliation to
a black tester plaintiff who proved discrimination in the process
of applying for housing."7 The plaintiff testified that the
knowledge that she was discriminated against harmed her
emotionally and hampered her relationship with her family and
her husband. The court ruled that "[tihe fact that [she] was a
tester [did] not affect the measure of her actual damages....
[No one should have to toughen themselves to racial discrimi-
nation-a tester has no reason to expect mistreatment at the
hands of ostensibly fairminded businesspeople." 88 It is difficult
to predict how juries8 9 and judges will react to tester requests
for compensatory damages, but it appears from the housing
cases that compensatory awards will be relatively low.
An award of punitive or compensatory damages would make
a tester a prevailing party under Hewitt, Rhodes, Garland, and
Farrar, but the amount must be "substantial" to support a
significant fee award. 9 ' Not surprisingly, courts do not agree
on what is substantial. The First and Seventh Circuits have
ruled respectively that $16,000 and $45,500 are not sub-
stantial. 9' The Second Circuit, in contrast, has ruled that a
186. Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9212, at *17, 1987 WL 18,393, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987).
187. Davis, 597 F. Supp. at 347.
188. Id. The court awarded only $2500 to the plaintiffs husband, who was also a
tester, because he "approached the [apartment] complex with a degree of cynicism...
and was consequently steadied for the blow of [the discrimination]." Id. at 348.
189. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, any party now has a right to a jury trial.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 1991). A jury recently provided each of two employment
tester plaintiffs $5000 in compensatory damages for sexual harassment in the course
of applying for placement services with an employment agency. Jury Awards $79,000
in Tester Case, supra note 185, at 98.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
191. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633,
641-42 & nn.11-12 (7th Cir. 1991); Stefan v. Laurenitis, 889 F.2d 363, 369 (1st Cir.
1989).
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$9500 compensatory award is substantial. 192  On the low end,
however, the results have been more consistent. The First
Circuit ruled in a section 1983 action that a $1000 award is not
sufficient to support a recovery of attorneys' fees, 93 and the
Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a district court's conclusion that
$100 in compensatory damages also is insufficient. 194 The few
reported tester cases decided under the FHA suggest that Title
VII testers will recover compensatory awards near the $1000
figure.'95 They are unlikely to obtain attorneys' fees based on
such awards.'9 6
192. Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1991).
193. Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1991).
194. Carr v. City of Florence, 934 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1991).
195. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
196. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, Congress
created an exception to the Hewitt, Rhodes, Garland, and Farrar prevailing-party rule
for so-called "mixed-motive" cases. The statutory provision was intended to overrule
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), in which the Court held that an
employer would not be liable in a Title VII action even if the plaintiff shows that an
impermissible factor (e.g., sex) was taken into account in making an employment
decision if the employer proves it would have made the same decision absent the
impermissible consideration. Id. at 242, 258.
Under the amendments to Title VII, if a complainant "demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp.
1991), and the respondent proves that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief. . ., and attorney's fees and
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under
[this section] and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i),(ii).
An underlying premise of the amendment is that an individual who proves that the
employer's actions were inconsistent with Title VII's proscriptions should be entitled
to attorneys' fees even if the individual is not entitled to other forms of relief. Testers
who prove that their Title VII rights were violated might seek fees using this reasoning.
The amendment, however, was intended specifically to overrule Price Waterhouse in
"mixed-motive" cases. It was not intended to address the plight of other Title VII
plaintiffs who can prove a violation of the Act but who are not entitled to significant
relief. See, e.g., Slade v. United States Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party although he proved that he was
discriminatorily denied a job where the defendant thereafter rejected the plaintiff's
application using nondiscriminatory criteria, reasoning that the plaintiff's success was
purely technical and that the outcome of the case did not change the legal relationship
between the parties).
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IV. POSSIBLE STATE LAw RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
TESTERS BY PRIVATE GROUPS OR INDMIDUALS
A. State Law Claims for Breach of Contract or Fraud
If the lack of remedies available to prevailing testers does not
completely discourage private parties from engaging in testing,
employers have some weapons available to deter the use of the
practice. Employers might attempt to discourage testing by
suing testers to recover out-of-pocket and opportunity costs.'97
Because testers have no bona fide interest in employment,
employers unnecessarily will incur the costs associated with
evaluating a tester's employment application. 9 ' An employer
might even be deprived of the services of an applicant with an
actual interest in employment if the employer first extends an
offer to a tester. 199
Breach of contract actions against testers generally should
fail because an applicant for employment ordinarily does not
make a binding promise to accept a job if an employer ultimate-
ly offers one. "[Ain application for employment is not a
contract; it is a mere solicitation of an offer of employment."2 °0
An applicant remains free, as a matter of contract law, to refuse
an employer's offer without liability for the time and money the
employer expended responding to the applicant's solicitation of
the offer.20' An applicant may "decide[ I whether to accept [the
197. See generally Skinner, supra note 62. The claims against testers could be
asserted as counterclaims in Title VII actions brought by testers or in independent suits
filed against testers who do not uncover evidence of discriminatory hiring practices.
198. E.g., Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris to the Honorable Evan J. Kemp, supra note
12, at E-1.
199. Id.
200. Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App.), review
denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4230 (Cal. 1991); see also Sims v. United Bridge & Iron, 402
P.2d 911, 914 (Okla. 1965) (holding that an inquiry by an applicant "as to the existence
of an 'opening'" was not itself an offer but was a solicitation of an offer of employment);
CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. & JOEL M. GROSSMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS § 3.1.2, at 29 (2d ed. 1989) ("[An applicant's submission of a resume...
should probably not be deemed an offer. ..
201. As Professor Farnsworth puts it,
[A] party that enters negotiations in the hope of the gain that will result from
ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if the other party
breaks off the negotiations. That loss includes out-of-pocket costs the
disappointed party has incurred, any worsening of its situation, and any
opportunities that it has lost as a result of the negotiations....
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employer's] offer on the terms [the employer] set forth or to
attempt to negotiate more favorable terms."20 2 The application
and the employer's evaluation of the applicant are part of the
precontractual negotiation process.203  If, during those
negotiations, either party decides to walk away, there is no
contract; if there is no contract, there can be no breach.2°
.. Although a duty of fair dealing is now generally imposed on the parties to
a contract, that duty is not formulated so as to extend to precontractual negotia-
tions.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 221 (1987).
202. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir.
1990); see also Harden, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (stating that an employment application
"is not a valid employment agreement, since it does not contain essential material
terms such as the job description or compensation"). A party is "free to call off the
negotiations at [its] pleasure, at any time before the parties [have] come to an
agreement on all of the terms. It is not an actionable wrong to dally in the vestibules
of obligation." Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 933 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 22 (1963 & Supp. 1992); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:7 (4th ed. 1990). Preliminary negotiations do not affect the
legal relations of the parties involved if neither party has made an "offer" to contract
with the other or an offer made has not been accepted. 1 CORBIN, supra, § 22. "An
offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24. "Acceptance of an offer is
a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited
or required by the offer." Id. § 50(1). When "the agreement reached constitute[s]
agreement on all of the terms that the parties themselves regarded as essential ... that
agreement conclude[s] the negotiations and form[s] a contract." Leeds v. First Allied
Conn. Corp., 521 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. Ch. 1986), appeal dismissed, 520 A.2d 1044 (Del.
1987).
204. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group,
Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1989). Professor Farnsworth explains:
Under the classic rules of offer and acceptance, there is no contractual liability
until a contract is made by the acceptance of an offer ....
... [C]ourts traditionally take a view of this precontractual period that...
results in a broad "freedom of negotiation." As a general rule, a party to
precontractual negotiations may break them off without liability at any time and
for any reason ... or for no reason at all.
Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 221. "With regard to contracts generally, it is said that
every contract results from an offer and the acceptance thereof. An offer becomes a
binding promise and results in a contract only when it is accepted." Sims, 402 P.2d at
913 (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981) ("A
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to
whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not
intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.").
These rules seem fully appropriate in the context of negotiations for an agreement
to enter into an at-will employment relationship. In virtually every American
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Ordinarily, then, an applicant for employment has not made a
legally binding promise to negotiate with the intent of entering
into an employment contract in the future.
Some employers, however, have suggested that in response to
the threat of testing allegedly posed by the EEOC's recent
announcements, they will require applicants for employment to
sign certifications of a bona fide interest in employment. 2 5 If
the applicant will not sign the certification, the employer will
not process the application. If a tester chooses to sign such a
certification, according to one employer representative, this will
establish beyond question that the tester is a liar and will
"taint" any evidence of discrimination that the tester obtains.0 6
The employer groups have ignored, thus far, the possibility that
such a certification could be an enforceable "preliminary
agreement to negotiate" that a tester with no interest in
employment would breach. An employer might recover reliance
damages for breach of this agreement, including the costs of
processing the tester's application and any lost opportunities
caused by the breach of the promise to negotiate.
Under a preliminary agreement to negotiate, the parties
undertake a general obligation of fair dealing in their negotia-
tions.20 7 Until recently, courts have been reluctant to enforce
these preliminary agreements on the grounds that they were
indefinite.2 °8 Many courts, however, now take the position that
"an agreement to negotiate in good faith ... if [it] otherwise
meet[s] the requisites of a contract, is an enforceable con-
tract."2 9 Although there may be some uncertainty concerning
jurisdiction, absent agreement to the contrary, either party to an employment
relationship may terminate that relationship at any time and for any reason without
contractual liability. E.g., Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as
a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 335 (1986).
Therefore, a tester would be able to enter into an at-will relationship with an employer
and quit the job the very next minute without breaching the contract. See, e.g., BAKALY
& GROSSMAN, supra note 200, § 7.1, at 104. "Furthermore, employees may not be liable
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for quitting their jobs." Id.
§ 7.1, at 105.
205. See supra note 16.
206. See supra note 16. This criticism ignores the fact that in most cases the
tester's credibility as a witness will not be important to proving the case. Where testers
with identical credentials are treated differently, the disparate treatment itself is the
most compelling proof of discrimination. In such cases, the tester may at most have to
respond to a claim that he or she intentionally influenced the employer to hire or
otherwise treat the majority-group tester more favorably.
207. Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 263.
208. See id. at 264-65.
209. Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299
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the content of the obligation to negotiate in good faith,
"[w]hatever one's definition of unfair dealing . . . a refusal to
negotiate where there is an agreement to do so plainly amounts
to a breach of the agreement. 210 Thus, a tester who signs an
agreement to negotiate in good faith or to seriously consider an
offer of employment would breach that agreement because he
does not intend to consider an offer of employment with the
employer. Recovery for breach of such an agreement should be
measured by the reliance interest of the nonbreaching party.
Thus, an employer could recover any expenses it incurred in
reliance on the tester's promise and any lost opportunities it
suffered as a result of the promise."' In the context of applica-
tions for lower-skilled, entry-level positions, the employer's
damages likely would not be significant; nonetheless, the threat
of suit may deter the use of testers.
Even without a preliminary agreement to negotiate, tort law
provides remedies for bad faith in negotiation.212 Tort claims
for fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure might be
asserted against testers. Courts have rarely applied the law of
misrepresentation to failed negotiations, 213 but if a tester
affirmatively states that she has a bona fide interest in employ-
ment and if the employer would not have considered the tester
for employment absent that representation, the employer
should be able to recover any damages it sustained as a result
of reliance on those representations. 2 4  A tester also might
(3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 265-67. To
determine whether the requirements for an enforceable contract have been met, a court
"must ask (1) whether both parties manifested an intention to be bound by the
agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite to be
enforced; and (3) whether there was consideration." Grossman, 795 F.2d at 299.
210. Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 273.
211. Id. at 264, 267.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981).
213. Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 235-36 (noting that there are few
circumstances where a party would have reason to overstate its eagerness to negotiate
and that even when such misrepresentations are made, the injured party may be
discouraged by the difficulty of proving fraudulent intent or of showing substantial
loss).
214. Id. at 233-34 ("A negotiating party may not with impunity fraudulently
misrepresent its intention to come to terms. Such an assertion is one of fact--of a state
of mind-and if fraudulent, it may be actionable in tort." (footnote omitted)).
This analysis is consistent with § 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That
section, entitled "Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentation," provides:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law
for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
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misrepresent his qualifications. Such a misrepresentation could
be a basis for tort liability if the employer would not have
considered the application but for the misrepresentation and
the employer suffers damages as a result of its reliance on the
misrepresentation.1 5
The more difficult question is whether an applicant has a
duty to disclose that she has no bona fide interest in employ-
ment. If an applicant has such a duty, an employer could
recover for damages it suffered as a result of nondisclosure.2 16
Professor Farnsworth has stated categorically that "[i]mplicit in
the act of negotiating is a representation of a serious intent to
reach agreement with the other party."217 Thus, he asserts that
tort law may impose liability in the absence of any explicit
representation if a party enters into negotiations without a
serious intent to reach an agreement or if a party, having lost
that intent, continues in negotiations and fails to give prompt
notice that it has changed its mind.218
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965).
Section 544 of the Restatement provides that "[tihe recipient of a fraudulent
misrepresentation of intention is justified in relying upon it if the existence of the
intention is material and the recipient has reason to believe that it will be carried out."
Id. § 544.
215. Fried v. AFTEC, Inc., 587 A.2d 290, 297-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(finding that an employer's counterclaim in a termination case brought by a former
employee stated an actionable claim for fraud insofar as the employer asserted that the
employee materially misrepresented his background, training, or skills).
216. Section 551 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled "Liability for
Nondisclosure" provides:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject
to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence
of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1981).
217. Farnsworth, supra note 201, at 234.
218. Id. In the specific context of "negotiations" attendant to decisions whether to
extend an offer of employment to an applicant, however, it is customary that the
employer runs the risk that an employee is not serious about entertaining an offer of
employment. Applicants often "test the waters" to see if other employment
opportunities are available and solicit offers that they are not serious about accepting.
At least in the initial stages of considering whether to offer a job to an applicant,
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Thus, under some circumstances, employers or others
targeted by testers would be able to assert viable state common-
law claims against testers for breach of contract or fraud.
Further, the threat of suit may suffice to deter the use of
testing for discriminatory hiring practices.
B. Ethical, Criminal, and Common-Law Proscriptions of
Conduct That Stirs Up Litigation
In various forms, state law prohibits soliciting individuals to
institute litigation, financial support of litigation by nonparties,
and other conduct that stirs up litigation. These proscriptions
could be used to deter the use of testers by private parties.
The attorney disciplinary rules prohibiting the solicitation of
individuals to institute suit discourage the "creation" of
lawsuits. For example, under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct "[a] lawyer may not solicit professional employment
from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family
or prior professional relationship ... when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."219
employers cannot assume that each applicant has a serious interest in employment
with them. It could be argued that at that stage in the process, the applicant has no
duty to disclose any lack of serious interest because that fact is not "basic to the
transaction." See supra note 216. Comment j to § 551 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts states:
A basic fact is a fact that is assumed by the parties as a basis for the transaction
itself. It is a fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the transaction, and is an
important part of the substance of what is bargained for or dealt with. Other
facts may serve as important and persuasive inducements to enter into the
transaction, but not go to its essence. These facts may be material, but they are
not basic. If the parties expressly or impliedly place the risk as to the existence
of a fact on one party or if the law places it there by custom or otherwise the
other party has no duty of disclosure.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. j (1965).
If, however, the applicant becomes aware that the employer is expending significant
amounts of time and money considering his suitability for employment or may be
bypassing other qualified candidates, the applicant's lack of interest may become basic
to the transaction. According to Comment I to § 551 of the Restatement, "good faith
and fair dealing may require a disclosure" where nondisclosure would be so extreme
and unfair as to be shocking "to the ethical sense of the community," even though the
law generally assigns the risk of nondisclosure to the party who is not aware of the
underlying facts. Id. § 551 cmt. 1.
219. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 7.3(a) (1992).
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Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
may not "recommend employment as a private practitioner, of
himself ... to a layperson who has not sought his advice,"22
and "[a] lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a
layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal action
shall not accept employment resulting from that advice."221
These rules, read literally, would prohibit in-person solicitation
of testers by attorneys.222
Moreover, states historically have prohibited "barratry,"
which at common law was defined as the practice of "frequently
exciting or stirring up suits and quarrels between others."22 3
Barratry reaches the conduct of lay persons as well as attor-
neys, and it prohibits a broader range of activity than the
antisolicitation rules. Many states have criminal statutes
outlawing barratry in broad terms.2 24 A court also may
recognize a tort cause of action for barratry.225 A prohibition
on stirring up litigation could be read to include the practice of
hiring, training, directing, and representing testers for the
purpose of creating a cause of action that otherwise did not
exist.
The attorney disciplinary rules of many states and the
common law of "maintenance" also may prohibit an attorney,
220. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981) (footnote
omitted).
221. Id. DR 2-104.
222. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by
letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but
does not include letters addressed or circulars distributed for advertising purposes.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1992).
223. Galinski v. Kessler, 480 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); accord
Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956), modified, 305 P.2d 1055 (Kan.
1957); see also Schackow v. Medical-Legal Consulting Serv., Inc., 416 A.2d 1303, 1312
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (stating that barratry is soliciting a person to make a claim
where the party has no existing relationship with that person and where the party may
recognize personal gain); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 382 A.2d
1226, 1228, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (stating that the common thread in barratry
cases is "fomenting litigation or other legal action when none was contemplated by the
client"), rev'd on other grounds, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978), and cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907
(1979).
224. Galinski, 480 N.E.2d at 1178 (noting that barratry has been made a criminal
offense by statutes in many, if not all, of the states). In Georgia, for example, a person
commits barratry if the person "knowingly and willfully... [s]olicits or encourages the
institution of a judicial or administrative proceeding or offers assistance therein before
being consulted by a complainant in relation thereto." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-95 (1992).
225. See Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that there
are strict limitations on such suits because the law does not look favorably upon them),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979).
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layperson, or lay organization from relieving testers of the
burden of paying the costs of litigation. Under the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, "a lawyer may advance .. .the
expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of
investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of
obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses."22 6  In jurisdictions that
follow the Model Code, agreements between testers and their
attorneys under which the attorneys do not seek reimbursement
for costs may be prohibited. 227 The common law of maintenance
may prohibit the payment of a tester's litigation costs by
anyone other than the tester. Like barratry, maintenance was
intended to prevent "multitudinous and useless lawsuits and
... the speculation in lawsuits."28 Maintenance "involve[s] an
officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to the
intermeddler by maintaining or assisting either party to the
action with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it."
229
Ethical bars on the solicitation of clients and payment of
litigation costs by attorneys, the criminal and tort offense of
barratry, and the common law of maintenance might be used by
employers to deter employment discrimination testing. Courts
often permit defendants to inquire into the ethics of plaintiffs'
attorneys and may disqualify counsel if the defense can show a
violation of the ethics rules. 230  The threat of disciplinary
proceedings and possible criminal or civil liability might deter
all but the most hardy counsel, lay organizations, or testers
from conducting testing audits.
The United States Supreme Court has held that wholesale
application of these various prohibitions on activities that
226. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1981) (emphasis
added). The Model Rules, on the other hand, permit a lawyer to advance court costs
and expenses and to make repayment contingent on the successful outcome of the litiga-
tion. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(1) (1992).
227. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class
Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 97-98 (1991).
228. Galinski, 480 N.E.2d at 1178; see also McKellips v. Mackintosh, 475 N.W.2d
926, 928 (S.D. 1991).
229. Galinski, 480 N.E.2d at 1178; see also American Hotel Management Assocs.,
Inc., v. Jones, 768 F.2d 562, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1985); Schackow v. Medical-Legal
Consulting Serv., Inc., 416 A.2d 1303, 1312-13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980); McKellips,
475 N.W.2d at 928; Giambattista v. National Bank of Commerce, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978), review denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1015 (1979).
230. Macey & Miller, supra note 227, at 96-97.
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support or encourage litigation could impinge on the free speech
and associational rights of attorneys and others. 3' The full
scope of the protection offered by the First Amendment,
however, is unclear. The Court has held only that informing
individuals of their legal rights and offering legal assistance is
protected by the First Amendment where a political agenda,
rather than a desire for profit, motivated the conduct.232 Thus,
the First Amendment may offer only limited protection to
attorneys and laypersons organizing testing audits and
subsequent litigation, as well as to testers themselves.
The Court recognized in NAACP v. Button that collective
action undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts
implicates the First Amendment.233  The Court ruled that
Virginia's barratry statute, which prohibited "any arrangement
by which prospective litigants are advised to seek the assis-
tance of particular attorneys,"234 could not be applied to the
NAACP's practice of urging "Negroes aggrieved by the allegedly
unconstitutional segregation of public schools in Virginia to
exercise their legal rights and to retain members of the
Association's legal staff."235 The Court ruled that the NAACP's
activities were protected because, in the context of the NAACP's
objectives, litigation is a form of political expression and not
simply a technique for resolving private differences.236
In 1978, the Court elaborated on the scope of Button in two
companion cases: In re Primus237 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n.238 In Primus, the Court held that the First Amendment
protected a lawyer who advised a lay person of her legal rights
and disclosed in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance
was available from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
Relying on Button, the Court held that the lawyer's commu-
nication with the prospective client was protected because "[tihe
ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political
expression and association, as well as a means of communi-
cating useful information to the public."239 Ohralik, on the
231. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,438-39 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428-29 (1963); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
232. See infra text accompanying note 236.
233. 371 U.S. at 428-29.
234. Id. at 433.
235. Id. at 437.
236. Id. at 429.
237. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
238. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
239. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431 (citation omitted).
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other hand, involved a personal injury lawyer's in-person
solicitation of two women who had been injured in an
automobile accident. The Court held that the state could
discipline the lawyer without offending Button and Primus
because the solicitation of "remunerative employment is a
subject [of commercial speech] only marginally affected with
First Amendment concerns."240
After Button, Primus, and Ohralik, a state could constitu-
tionally prohibit an attorney or lay person motivated by a desire
for pecuniary gain from in-person solicitation of individuals to
serve as testers and as plaintiffs in any resulting litigation.
Solicitation by or on behalf of groups who use litigation as a
form of political expression would be protected by the First
Amendment so long as the lay organization did not "exert
control over the actual conduct of any ensuing litigation"24' and
did not exist for the primary purpose of financial gain through
the recovery of attorneys' fees.242
The scope of Button and Primus, however, is uncertain.
Those cases protect only an individual's right to inform lay
persons of their legal rights and to offer legal assistance to
them to assert those rights. It is not clear that the reasoning
of those cases would extend to the use of testers, because the
use of testers is intended to create a cause of action and not
simply to encourage individuals to assert existing causes of
action. Thus, despite Button and Primus, testing by public-
interest groups may not be protected by the First Amendment.
State law therefore might be used to punish those who assist in
stirring up litigation through the use of testers.
C. Ethics Rules Barring Attorneys from Contacting
a Represented Party
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility contain virtually identical
restrictions on contacts between lawyers and persons who have
retained counsel. Model Rule 4.2 provides: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
240. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459.
241. Primus, 436 U.S. at 439.
242. Id. at 431.
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representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do SO."
24 3
There is no accepted interpretation of the scope of this
prohibition. Under a broad reading, the use of testers to
uncover evidence on which to base a charge of discrimination
might be prohibited. This uncertainty might further deter the
use of testers.
The rules barring contact with represented parties apparently
were intended to protect a represented individual from the
perceived ability of a lawyer, through artful questioning, to
obtain a damaging concession or other evidence from the
individual in the absence of counsel. That concern would not
seem to be implicated by a tester who, at an attorney's
direction, applies for employment and participates in the
evaluation or screening process to determine whether the
employer discriminates.2"
The rules also were intended, however, to preserve the repre-
sented party's relationship with counsel by preventing direct
contact without counsel's consent.245  Read literally, and
243. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1992). The Model Code
of Professional Responsibility provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (1981) (footnote omitted).
244. See United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.) (finding that a
prosecutor's use of a government informant to tape a conversation with a criminal
defendant did not implicate the sorts of ethical problems addressed by the rules
prohibiting contact with represented parties), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, and cert.
denied sub nom. Parker v. United States, 454 U.S. 828 (1981); United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that a prosecutor who
instructed an informant to record a conversation with a represented criminal defendant
did not violate the rule because the defendant was not in danger of being tricked by the
prosecutor's artfully contrived questions into giving his case away), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 989 (1974); People v. White, 567 N.E.2d 1368, 1386-87 (Ill. App. Ct.) (finding that
an attorney's knowledge of an eavesdropping operation on a represented party did not
present the danger that the represented party would be subjected to the attorney's
superior legal skill and acumen), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 922 (1991).
245. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated,
989 F.2d 1032 (1993); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs.,
745 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990); Bouge v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D.
560, 567-68 (D. Utah 1990); United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 652 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1983); White, 567 N.E.2d at
1386-87.
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somewhat consistent with this purpose, the no-contact rules
could impede the use of testers.2 One way to avoid the rule
might be to use lay testers working under the supervision and
at the direction of lay persons. This tactic, however, is unlikely
to succeed because attorneys likely would be involved in some
significant way in the planning and execution of a testing audit.
The no-contact rules apply to attorneys' agents, and a tester
would be the lawyer's agent for purposes of the rule because
litigation is the anticipated outcome of the process.247
The lawyer directing the contact violates the rules if the lawyer knows that the party
contacted is represented in the matter. Many corporate employers have in-house or
retained counsel. Knowledge of that fact alone may be sufficient to satisfy the
knowledge requirement in a given case. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational
Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 670, 701 (1992) (stating that corporations and other formal entities may be able
to use their regular counsel to monitor and thus perhaps to deter contacts with
investigators).
Under a broad reading of the Rule, the company employee responsible for processing
the tester's application would be a "party." In the case of an organization,
[Rule 4.2] prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the
matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in
connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of
civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the
part of the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt (1992). An individual
responsible for screening applicants for employment likely would fall into one or more
of these categories.
246. See Karlan, supra note 245, at 701 (stating that a broad reading of the no-
contact rules could impede many civil and criminal investigations).
247. The rules prohibit communications between a lawyer and a represented party.
The courts have held universally that an individual acting at the direction of a lawyer
is the lawyer's agent for purposes of the rules. See United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d
259, 266 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that [b]oth government lawyers and government
agents must be aware and respectful of the ethical guideline [of Model Rule 4.2] that
forbids exparte contacts with a represented defendant"); Jamil, 707 F.2d at 645 (stating
that DR 7-104(A)(1) "may be found to apply to non-attorney government law
enforcement officers when they act as the alter ego of government prosecutors"); Upjohn
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1213-14 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(finding that the ethical no-contact rules apply to nonlawyers hired by lawyers to collect
evidence from an adverse party); see also Karlan, supra note 245, at 702 (noting that
most courts agree that the no-contact rules apply to nonattorney investigators acting
under an attorney's direction).
Under the broadest interpretation of the rules, contacts with represented persons are
prohibited even though formal proceedings have not commenced. See United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that DR 7-104(A)(1) is not
limited to the moment of indictment because the timing of an indictment lies
substantially within the control of the prosecutor, who could manipulate grand jury
proceedings to avoid the encumbrance of an indictment); United States v. Killian, 639
F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.) (suggesting that the rule may apply to a preindictment contact
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Using the broadest reading of the no-contact rules, some
courts have suggested that prior to an indictment an undercov-
er agent may not contact a represented target of a criminal
investigation and record incriminating statements made during
any conversations.248 Under the rationale of these cases, the
use of testers may violate the ethics rules. Moreover, the courts
that favor a broad reading of the rules have not delineated
clearly the conduct of informants that would be prohibited.249
Given this uncertainty, attorneys may forgo representing
testers.250 A variety of sanctions could be ordered for violation
with a represented suspect), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United States v.
Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1973) (same); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d
110, 112 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Jamil, 546 F. Supp. at
657-58 (holding that a no-contact rule attaches at the early pretrial stages); People v.
Sharp, 197 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a district attorney may not
communicate with a criminal defendant whom she knows to be represented by counsel
even if the communication is limited to an inquiry into conduct for which the defendant
has not been charged); White, 567 N.E.2d at 1386-87 (stating that the no-contact rule
may apply prior to the bringing of judicial charges).
The rules restrict the conduct of a lawyer acting while representing a client. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1992); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (1981). A lawyer overseeing an audit for the purposes of
litigation would be representing a client. Every court that has addressed the question
has held that the rules apply to private lawyers representing clients in civil cases as
well as to government lawyers. See Marc A. Schwartz, Note, Prosecutorial Investiga-
tions and DR 7-104(A)(1), 89 COLUM. L. REv. 940, 943 & nn.19-20 (1989).
248. See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839-40; Killian, 639 F.2d at 210; Durham, 475 F.2d
at 211; Thomas, 474 F.2d at 112. Most courts, however, have not interpreted the no-
contact rules to prohibit contacts occurring before formal proceedings have commenced.
Courts have held in civil cases that the rule does not apply until suit is filed. See
Faragher v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 91-2380, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1810,
at *3, 1992 WL 25,729, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1992) (finding that an attorney who
represented a client who was injured in the course of his employment could send
investigators to question the client's fellow employees before suit was filed because the
employer was not represented in the matter and was not a "party" until formal proceed-
ings were commenced). In the criminal context, most courts have held that the no-
contact rule applies only after an indictment is returned. See United States v. Ryans,
903 F.2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir.) (noting that the rule contemplates an adversarial
relationship between litigants, and that a party should not be able to preclude
investigations of its activities simply because it retained counsel), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
855 (1990); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852
(1983); Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 955; Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1436. Under this narrower
reading of the no-contact rules, only the use of testers to corroborate a charge already
filed would be barred.
249. See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839-40 (stating that although the use of informants
frequently will fall outside the scope of the rule, "in some instances a government
prosecutor may... violate the ethical precepts of DR 7-104(A)(1)").
250. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 247, at 950 (noting that under Hammad and other
decisions, investigative communications will be inhibited because an attorney cannot
know how far the court is willing to go; the court may decide that a certain
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of the rule, including dismissal, suppression of evidence ob-
tained through the proscribed contact, contempt citations, and
disciplinary proceedings.
251
V. THE EEOC's AUTHORITY TO USE TESTERS
TO ENFORCE TITLE VII
Parts III and IV identified reasons to believe that relying on
private groups or individuals to use testers and on private
attorneys to represent testers in subsequent litigation will be
insufficient to fill the enforcement void identified in Part I.
Thus, public enforcement by the EEOC may be the only way to
assure that testers will be used effectively to combat
discrimination in hiring. The issue is complicated by the fact
that the EEOC could not engage in testing absent an
amendment to Title VII. A close look at the provisions of Title
VII reveals that Congress did not grant the Commission the
power to use testers in its investigations.
A The EEOC's General Investigatory Authority
The EEOC was created in 1964 as part of Title VII,252 and the
agency is authorized to "prevent any person from engaging in
any [discriminatory] employment practice."253 Title VII's
enforcement process begins with an administrative phase
controlled by the EEOC. A "charge" first must be filed with the
EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful
employment practice. 251 "[A] charge is sufficient when the
Commission receives from the person making the charge a
written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties,
and to describe generally the action or practices complained
of."255 Within ten days, "the Commission shall serve a notice of
investigative technique violates the ethical precepts of DR 7-104(A)(1)).
251. See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1461.
252. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 705(a), 78 Stat. 241, 258
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988)).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1988).
254. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984).
255. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1992). Under Title VII, the Commission has the
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the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the
alleged unlawful employment practice)" on the respondent.256
Thereafter, the Commission must investigate the charge.257
The EEOC's investigatory powers are set forth exclusively in
sections 2000e-8 and 2000e-9. The former provides that
[iun connection with any investigation of a charge . . . the
Commission or its designated representative shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any
person being investigated or proceeded against that relates
to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchap-
ter and is relevant to the charge under investigation.258
In section 2000e-9, the Commission is granted the same
subpoena power that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) was given to conduct investigations of unfair labor
practice charges under the National Labor Relations Act.25 9
If the Commission finds reasonable cause to believe that the
authority to issue regulations governing the form and content of charges. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1988).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
257. Id. In a state with a law that prohibits the charged practice and establishes
an enforcement agency, however, the EEOC may not initiate its own investigation until
the state agency has been afforded an opportunity to investigate and resolve the matter.
Id. § 2000e-5(c), (d).
258. Id. § 2000e-8(a).
259. Id. § 2000e-9. Under 29 U.S.C. § 161, the National Labor Relations Board is
given
access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of
any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter
under investigation or in question. The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon
application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party
subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production
of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation requested in such application.
In case of... refusal to obey a subpena [sic] ... any district court ... within
the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of
which said person guilty of ... refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts
business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue to such
person an order requiring such person to appear before the Board, its member,
agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give
testimony touching the matter under investigation.., and any failure to obey
such order of court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 161(1), (2) (1988).
The EEOC regulations based on the subpoena power granted by Title VII are at 29
C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1992).
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charge is true, it must "endeavor to eliminate any... alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion. "26 ° If these methods are
unsuccessful, the Commission may bring a civil action against
the respondent.26 ' If the Commission concludes that there is
not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it "shall
dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to
be aggrieved and the respondent of its action."262 After receiv-
ing this notice, the aggrieved party may file a private civil
action against the respondent.26 3 If the Commission has not
filed a civil action or entered into a conciliation agreement
within 180 days after a charge is filed, the aggrieved party may
file a civil action.26' An aggrieved party always has the right to
intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission on his
behalf.2 6
5
The investigatory authority of the EEOC was a subject of
debate in 1964 when Title VII was originally passed and again
when the statute was amended in 1972. Some legislators were
concerned that the EEOC's investigatory powers needed to be
limited to protect employers' rights.266 The Commission's
investigatory powers were limited in response to these concerns.
The Commission is permitted to conduct only those
investigations identified in the provisions of Title VII.2 6 7 Even
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
261. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
262. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
263. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
264. Id.
265. Id. For an overview of the structure of the administrative phase of Title VII,
see EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62-64 (1984); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,
432 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1977); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 444-45 (6th Cir. 1977).
266. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1971); 1 EEOC, LEGISLATVE
HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 1019,3007 (comments
of Sen. Humphrey), 3019 (comments of Sen. Dirksen), 3045 (interpretative
memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case); see also Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65;
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 41 (4th Cir. 1971); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC,
412 F.2d 462, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1969); United States Steel Corp. v. EEOC, 6 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 8980, at 6168 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973); Teresa A.
Belmonte, Note, Factually or Statistically Based Commissioner's Charge: A New Ap-
proach to EEOC Enforcement of Title VII, 63 B.U. L. REv. 645, 660-64 (1983).
267. Lawrence A. Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment
Discrimination Charges Under Title VII: Employers' Rights in an Adversary Process,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 880 (1977); Norman Kallen, Note, Investigatory Power of an
Administrative Agency, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 50, 50 (1967).
In EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974), the court recognized
the limits of the EEOC's investigatory powers. It granted partial summary judgment
for the employer in a civil action brought by the EEOC, in part because it found that
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if a particular investigative technique saves Commission
resources, is particularly effective, or furthers the purpose of
eliminating discrimination in the workplace, the Commission
may not employ that technique unless Congress has authorized
it to do so. 2 8  The EEOC lacks traditional law enforcement
powers, such as the power to conduct undercover operations. 269
Congress did not explicitly authorize the Commission to conduct
undercover investigations of employers to obtain evidence for
the purpose of filing a charge under Title VII. Therefore,
absent an amendment to the statute, the Commission cannot
employ its own testers or orchestrate the use of testers by
private groups.
If Congress intended to give the EEOC power to conduct
undercover investigations, it would have been more explicit,
given the disputes over the EEOC's investigatory power. It has
the statute did not authorize the EEOC to propound interrogatories on a respondent
employer during the investigation of a charge and to treat them as admitted if the
employer did not answer them. Id. at 793. The court reasoned that allowing the use
of this procedure "would . .. encourage the Commission to exercise additional power
which might infringe upon the rights of defendants." Id. at 795.
268. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 379 (4th Cir. 1976) (Widener, J.,
dissenting); EEOC v. Red Arrow Corp., 392 F. Supp. 64, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v.
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991-92 (D. Md. 1974).
269. EEOC v. First Nat'l Bank, 614 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S.
917(1981). In First National Bank, the EEOC brought suit against the defendant bank
after investigating a charge of race discrimination filed by a former bank employee.
The bank filed a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. When the EEOC refused to
comply with discovery requests seeking information relevant to the counterclaim, the
district court dismissed the EEOC's action. Id. at 1006. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the counterclaim was not viable because it was not authorized by the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id. at 1007 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976)). The
bank claimed that the EEOC was an investigative or law enforcement agency within
the meaning of the FTCA, and thus was not entitled to immunity for malicious
prosecution. The statute provides "[that, with regard to acts or omissions of... law
enforcement officers of the United States [the immunity waiver provisions of the
statute] shall apply to any claim arising . .. out of ... malicious prosecution." 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988). The FTCA defines an investigative or law enforcement officer
as "any officer of the Unites States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to
seize evidence or to make arrests for violation of Federal law." Id.
The court rejected the bank's argument, correctly reasoning that under Title VII,
the EEOC's agents are given the power to: 'at all reasonable times have access
to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any
person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful
employment practices covered by [Title VIII." They are not, however, given
authority to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests for violation of
federal law.
FirstNat'l Bank, 614 F.2d at 1007-08 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1976)) (alteration
in original).
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been more explicit in empowering other federal agencies to
conduct undercover operations. For example, internal revenue
agents, in addition to having subpoena power, are authorized
to enter premises to examine taxable objects, to execute and
serve search and arrest warrants, to make arrests, and to
conduct undercover investigative operations "necessary for the
detection and prosecution of offenses under the internal
revenue laws."27° Congress did not give similar powers to the
EEOC.
B. Precharge Investigatory Authority
Even if Title VII were interpreted to give the Commission the
discretion to use testers, the Commission could not employ
testers to obtain evidence for the purpose of filing a charge of
discrimination against an employer because the Commission
has no authority to investigate until after a charge of
discrimination is filed. Section 2000e-5(b) authorizes the
Commission to investigate charges of discrimination. 17 ' There
is no provision authorizing an investigation absent a charge.
Likewise, under section 2000e-8(a), the EEOC is entitled to
examine only evidence relevant to "the charge under investiga-
tion."272 Many courts have recognized that the Commission has
no power to investigate before a charge is filed. .The
270. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602-7606, 7608(c) (1988); see also United States v. Little, 753
F.2d 1420, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1984).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
272. Id. § 2000e-8(a); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984)
(holding that the Commission is entitled to access only to evidence relevant to the
charge under investigation); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 43 (4th Cir. 1971)
(Boreman, J., dissenting) (stating that it is a significant restriction on the powers of the
EEOC that the Commission may demand and obtain only evidence relevant to a
charge).
273. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 62-65; EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d
359, 364-68 (4th Cir. 1976); Graniteville Co., 438 F.2d at 35, 41; EEOC v. Maryland
Nat'l Bank, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1094, 1096 (D. Md. 1986); EEOC v.
Institute of Gas Technology, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Marshall, 465 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979); United States
Steel Corp. v. EEOC, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 8980, at 6166 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487
F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973).
Courts have come to the same conclusion concerning the NLRB's investigatory
powers under the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rex Disposables,
Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that the NLRB must
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commentators also have noted this limitation.274 As the
Supreme Court has stated,
the EEOC's investigative authority is tied to charges filed
with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that
possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant
to matters within their jurisdiction, the EEOC is entitled
to access only to evidence "relevant to the charge under
investigation."
... [Tihis limitation on the Commission's authority is not
accidental. As Senators Clark and Case, the "bipartisan
captains" responsible for Title VII during the Senate
debate, explained...,
It is important to note that the Commission's power
to conduct an investigation can be exercised only after
a specific charge has been filed in writing. In this
respect the Commission's investigatory power is
significantly narrower than that of the [FTC] or of the
Wage and Hour Administrator, who are authorized to
conduct investigations, inspect records, and issue
subpenas, [sic] whether or not there has been any
complaint of wrongdoing.
275
This limitation prevents the EEOC from engaging in general
fact-finding investigations. The Commission
is not empowered to conduct general fact-finding missions
concerning the affairs of the nation's work force and
employers. The only legitimate purpose for an EEOC
proceed pursuant to a charge, not on its own initiative). As noted earlier, Congress
gave the EEOC the same subpoena power it granted the NLRB. See supra note 259
and accompanying text.
274. William F. Gardner, The Development of the Meaning of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 23 ALA. L. REV. 451, 474 (1971); Katz, supra note 267, at 880; R.
Gaull Silberman, The EEOC Is Meeting the Challenge: Response to David Rose, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1641, 1642 (1989); Belmonte, supra note 266, at 660.
275. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting INTERPRETATIVE MEMORANDUM OF
TITLE VII, 110 CONG. REc. 7212, 7214 (citations omitted) (alterations in original)); see
also Belmonte, supra note 266, at 659. The only exception is that the EEOC has the
power to investigate absent a charge under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, 626(a) (1988); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.
Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991) ("[The EEOC's role in combatting age discrimination is not
dependent on the filing of a charge"); Nicholson v. CPC Intl, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 226 (3d
Cir. 1989).
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investigation is to prepare for action against an employer
charged with employment discrimination, or to drop the
matter entirely if the . . . charge . . . [is] unfounded.276
Moreover, under section 2000e-5(b), the Commission must
notify a respondent named in a charge within ten days.2 77 The
Senate Report accompanying the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
which included the ten-day notice requirement, stated that the
notice requirement was intended to protect employers' rights by
insuring that fairness and due process are part of the enforce-
ment process. 27' Notice also provides the employer with the
opportunity to: 1) participate in the investigation of the
allegations; 2) preserve relevant evidence; 3) conduct its own
investigation; and 4) prepare for subsequent enforcement
proceedings.2 7 ' Numerous Commission regulations, policies,
and procedures reflect the Commission's understanding that the
employer should be notified of, and given the opportunity to
participate in, investigations of discrimination charges.28° An
276. EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 820 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated,
486 U.S. 1019 (1988). If, however, the Commission uncovers evidence of an uncharged
unlawful practice while investigating a charge, it may file a new charge to cover the
practice in question. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1372, 1376 (E.D. Wis.), aft'd, 668 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981); Extended and
Systemic Investigations Procedures, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) I 803, at 718 (July
1991).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
278. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971); see also Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
at 74. Prior to 1972, the statute required that the EEOC notify an employer that a
charge was filed against it but did not specify a time limit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(Supp. 1972) (amended 1972); see also Belmonte, supra note 266, at 665.
279. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 78, 89-90; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 371 n.30 (1977); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 448 (6th Cir. 1977); EEOC v.
Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 794-95 (D. Md. 1974).
280. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.21(b), 1601.24, 1601.25 (1992) (stating that the EEOC
will notify the respondent when it determines whether reasonable cause exists to
believe that a charge is true and when it terminates conciliation efforts); Intake of
Commission Initiated Actions, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), 1 372, at 441 (Mar. 1989)
(stating that the EEOC must notify the respondent of the date, place, and circumstanc-
es to be covered by an upcoming investigation); Extended and Systemic Investigation
Procedures, id. 1 809, at 721-22 (Feb. 1988) (detailing the procedure for the first
meeting with an employer facing a pattern or practice investigation); Evidence, id.
2024, at 2038-39 (Apr. 1988) (stating that EEOC investigators must specify the scope
of their investigation to the respondent); Interviews, id. 826, at 732 (Mar. 1988)
(stating that the respondent has the right to have a spokesperson present during
interviews conducted by EEOC investigators with management level employees); id.
827, at 733-34 (Mar. 1988) (stating that an EEOC investigator always should present
proper credentials showing affiliation with the EEOC when conducting interviews); On
Site Investigation, id. II 902-903, at 781-82 (Mar. 1988) (stating that the EEOC must
notify an employer of any on-site inspection); id. 1 923, at 792-93 (Mar. 1988)
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investigation without notice to the employer would be contrary
to the provisions of Title VII limiting the EEOC's investigative
power to charges of discrimination.28' Obviously, testers must
be used without notice to the employer.
Whether the Commission is authorized to conduct
investigations absent a charge of discrimination is complicated
somewhat by the fact that Congress gave commissioners the
power to file their own charges of discrimination.282 Congress
did not give the commissioners power, however, to conduct
investigations in order to obtain evidence to serve as the basis
for such charges. It may seem incongruous that commissioners
have the power to file charges but cannot investigate to obtain
evidence on which to base them. This scheme is consistent,
however, with the purposes Congress envisaged for charges of
discrimination in general and for commissioner's charges in
particular. One reason Congress gave commissioners the power
to file charges was to enable an aggrieved person to have a
personal charge of discrimination considered by the Commission
where, because of fear of reprisal, that person desires
confidentiality.2 3 In those circumstances, the Commission does
not need investigative power prior to filing the charge-the
aggrieved party provides the necessary information. As with
charges of discrimination filed by aggrieved parties who do not
request anonymity, the Commission investigates after the
charge is filed to determine whether there is reasonable cause
to believe it is true.
Commissioners also were given the power to file charges to
challenge a pattern or practice of discrimination.2 "4 "Pattern or
(indicating that the EEOC must notify the employer of the EEOC's desire to examine
records).
281. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 450.
282. Section 2000e-5(b) provides that charges may be filed "by or on behalf of a
person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1988).
283. EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., 643 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing S. REP.
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971)).
284. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1971). Section 2000e-6(e)
provides that
[t]he Commission shall have authority to investigate and act on a charge of a
pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such actions
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 2000e-5
of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1988).
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practice discrimination is a pervasive and deeply imbedded
form of discrimination."2 5 In carrying out its mission to pursue
these cases, the Commission seeks "to identify situations where
the patterns of employment discrimination are the most serious,
and where maintenance of a successful 'systemic case' will have
a significant positive impact on the employment opportunities
available to minorities and women."28 6 Prior to 1972, the
Attorney General had the statutory authority to bring pattern-
and-practice cases in the district courts without first filing a
charge of discrimination with the Commission.28 7 The authority
to prosecute pattern-and-practice cases was transferred to the
EEOC in 1972 and was incorporated into the regular charge
processing system.28 8 Congress recognized that the EEOC "has
access to the most current statistical computations and analyses
"289regarding employment patterns, in part because the EEOC
has the power, under section 2000e-8(c)(3), to require employers
to make reports that are "reasonable, necessary, or appropriate"
for enforcement of the statute.290 The statute also authorizes
the Commission to coordinate its recordkeeping requirements
with "interested State and Federal agencies" that provide the
Commission with further sources of information.29'
Congress contemplated that the EEOC, in exercising its
power to file charges challenging a pattern or practice of
discrimination, would review data provided by employers
pursuant to these various recordkeeping requirements as well
as other data already in the Commission's possession.292 The
Commission's policies and procedures incorporate this
expectation. In determining whether to issue a pattern-and-
practice charge, Commission personnel review 1) information
285. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).
286. Processing Systemic Cases, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 561, at 571 (Feb.
1988). For the criteria that the EEOC uses to identify appropriate pattern-and-practice
cases, see id. 562, at 571-72.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970) (amended 1972).
288. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat.
103, 107.
289. H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1984).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)(3) (1988). By Commission regulation, employers of 100
or more employees must file annual "EEO-1" reports with the EEOC detailing the racial
and gender composition of their work forces by job classification. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7
(1992).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1988).
292. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 80 (noting that most of the data on which a
Commission pattern-or-practice charge is based is provided by the employer itself in the
form of annual reports filed with the EEOC).
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obtained in prior investigations or from prior complainants who
elected not to file charges; 2) media reports; 3) information
obtained by "interested" state or federal agencies; 4) EEO-1
reports;293 and 5) information obtained by civil rights
organizations, employment agencies, and union and trade
officials.294
The courts, commentators, and EEOC agree that two
legitimate purposes for a commissioner's charge are protecting
an aggrieved party's identity and challenging a pattern or
practice of discrimination. 295  The absence of congressional
authorization to the EEOC to investigate employers for the
purpose of filing commissioner's charges is consistent with those
two purposes.
The scheme likewise is consistent with the role of charges in
the enforcement scheme of Title VII-simply to notify the
EEOC and the employer that someone believes that the
employer has violated the statute.2 96  When the statute
originally was enacted in 1964, the Attorney General could not
file a charge unless the allegations were based on reasonable
cause to believe that the unlawful employment practice had
occurred.297 As part of the 1972 amendments, the reasonable
cause language was removed, thereby loosening the constraints
on commissioners' power to file charges.298  Since 1972,
commissioners have been permitted to file charges although the
allegations were not substantiated.299  The subsequent
investigation is intended to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe the allegations of the charge are
true.300 Therefore, a charge is not the same as a complaint
initiating suit. To put the EEOC and respondent on notice that
293. See supra note 290.
294. Intake of Commission Initialed Actions, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 372, at
441-43 (Mar. 1989); see also Systemic Case Processing, id. 563, at 572-73 (Feb. 1988)
(describing the procedure used to select pattern-and-practice respondents); Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. at 70-71; Belmonte, supra note 266, at 647.
295. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 62; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6, 1601.7, 1601.11 (1992);
Belmonte, supra note 266, at 647; EEOC, THE EEOC AND THE LAWS IF ENFORCES: A
REFERENCE MANUAL, STATEMENTS AND PROCEDURES (1988).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 278-81.
297. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241, 259
(amended 1972).
298. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. (4)(a),
§ 706(b), 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988)).
299. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 62-63, 71, 76-77 & n.32; Belmonte, supra note 266,
at 648 & n.31.
300. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 71; EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055, 1066 (6th
Cir. 1982); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1971).
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someone believes that the respondent may have violated the
statute and to initiate the investigation, the charging party,
including a commissioner, need not state facts sufficient to
make out a prima facie case.3"' Therefore, precharge investiga-
tory power is unnecessary.
302
VI. ADVANTAGES TO AUTHORIZING THE EEOC TO USE
TESTERS TO UNCOVER AND REMEDY DISCRIMINATION
IN HIRING FOR LOWER-SKILLED, ENTRY-LEVEL POSITIONS
A. Relief Available in Tester Litigation Brought
by the EEOC
The EEOC should litigate cases on behalf of testers because
the EEOC is more likely than a private party to obtain
injunctive relief.30 3 Moreover, because private individuals and
groups face obstacles in testing on their own,3°4 Congress should
give the EEOC authority to use testers to fill the existing
enforcement void.305
The barrier to injunctive relief posed by testers' lack of
interest in employment 3 6 could be overcome if the EEOC prose-
cuted tester cases under either its pattern-and-practice power
30 7
301. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 68; K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d at 1067; Graniteville Co.,
438 F.2d at 38.
302. The EEOC also lacks the authority to use testers to obtain corroborative
evidence after a charge is filed. Under the current statutory scheme, the EEOC
requests information from the respondent employer when investigating a charge. If the
employer objects to the nature or scope of the request, it can refuse to respond and force
the EEOC to initiate a subpoena enforcement action in federal district court. This
scheme was intended to balance the EEOC's power to investigate fully charges of
discrimination against the rights of employers to challenge the EEOC's demands for
information. In re EEOC, 709 F.2d 392, 396-97 (5th Cir. 1983); Reynolds Metal Co. v.
Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365, 373 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brown, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977). The use of testers to
corroborate a charge would deprive employers of this statutory right.
303. The EEOC is not authorized to recover attorneys' fees under Title VII because
the Commission, unlike private litigants, needs no inducement to enforce Title VII.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 n.20 (1978). It is required by
statute to enforce Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
304. See supra Parts III & IV.
305. See supra Part I.
306. See supra Part III.B.
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1988) (stating that the EEOC may request a
permanent injunction if it is "necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights
herein described"). For a discussion of pattern-and-practice suits, see supra notes
284-94 and accompanying text.
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or its power to file an action on behalf of an aggrieved
individual. In these latter actions, the EEOC does not act
simply as a proxy for victims of discrimination. 30 8 In addition
to obtaining relief for the charging party, the EEOC has an
independent right of action to vindicate the public interest in
preventing employment discrimination. 3 9 Thus, the EEOC may
seek classwide relief under Title VII without being certified as
a class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.310 Even if the individual complainants in a Title VII action
brought by the EEOC are made whole by the relief ordered by
the district court, the EEOC may seek injunctive relief to
protect others and to deter future unlawful discrimination.31'
In fact, during Justice Clarence Thomas's tenure at the EEOC,
the Commission announced that as part of its litigation and
conciliation efforts in individual cases of discrimination it would
require that all respondents agree to refrain from the specific
unlawful employment practices involved in the case or from any
further discrimination. 312  The EEOC also announced that it
intended to require employers to notify all employees that the
company would not violate Title VII and, if warranted, require
employers to take specific measures to ensure that discrim-
ination would not take place in the future. 13
The Commission need not wait for congressional authoriza-
tion to litigate cases on behalf of testers. It currently has the
power to bring pattern-and-practice cases and to litigate cases
on behalf of aggrieved parties. If private groups or individuals
do not use testers, however, the EEOC will have no tester suits
to litigate. Therefore, Congress should amend the statute to
permit the EEOC to engage in testing.31 4
308. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1510-12 (9th Cir. 1989).
309. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980); EEOC v. Goodyear Aero-
space Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at
1515.
310. General Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 326; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
311. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1519; Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d at 1544;
see also EEOC v. Red Baron Steak Houses, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 49, 53 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (granting the EEOC an injunction forbidding the defendant from violating
Title VII in the future to deter the defendant and to protect employees of the company
in a case involving two employees who were discharged in violation of Title VII, but
who were not entitled to reinstatement).
312. EEOC Policy Statement on Remedies and Relief for Individual Cases of
Unlawful Discrimination, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at E-1, E-1 (Feb. 6, 1985).
313. Id.
314. Because its personnel already are overburdened, the Commission might
contract with private groups to engage in testing according to standards and practices
promulgated by the EEOC.
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B. Preemption of State Laws That Interfere with Testing
If Congress authorized the EEOC to use testers to uncover
discriminatory hiring practices, state laws that interfered with
the EEOC's efforts to fulfill that congressional mission would be
preempted. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law
is supreme, notwithstanding the laws of the states.3 15  "In
determining whether a state [law] is pre-empted by federal law
and therefore invalid . .. , [the] sole task is to ascertain the
intent of Congress."316
State law may be preempted in three ways. First, Congress
may preempt state law by express statutory terms. 17 Second,
intent to preempt may be inferred where federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive, leaving no room for supplementary
state regulation. 3" Third, in the absence of express or implied
preemption, federal law may preempt state law "to the extent
it actually conflicts with federal law."319 This is referred to as
"conflict preemption."
The Supreme Court has stated that in Title VII "Congress
has explicitly disclaimed any intent categorically to pre-empt
state law or to 'occupy the field' of employment discrimination
law."32' Rather, "[iln two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
§§ 708 and 1104, Congress has indicated that state laws will be
pre-empted only if they actually conflict with federal law.'32'
315. U.S. CONST. art. VT, cl. 2. This clause provides that the laws of the United
States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
316. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
317. E.g., id.; Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F. Supp. 928, 931 (S.D.
Tex. 1992).
318. E.g., Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81; Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957
F.2d 1257, 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1992); Thornton, 788 F. Supp. at 932.
319. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281.
320. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7 & 2000h-4 (1988)).
321. Id. Section 708 provides:
Nothing in this [title] shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this [title].
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 708, 78 Stat. 241, 262 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988)).
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Testing activities by private groups or individuals currently
are not protected from the application of state law because
Congress never considered whether testing was an appropriate
means of enforcing Title VII. Though the rights that Congress
created in Title VII are sufficient to confer standing on testers
who receive disparate treatment,322 the statute is silent on the
use of testers. In fact, as discussed earlier, the EEOC does not
have the authority to use testers.323 Conflict preemption
analysis would not require striking down state laws that inter-
fered with testing because it cannot be said with any assurance
that those laws stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."32'
State law restrictions on the use of testers would not interfere
with the enforcement procedures Congress outlined in Title
VII.
3 2 5
Congress could expressly preempt state laws that interfere
with testing if it authorized the EEOC to conduct or direct
testing activities to uncover and remedy violations of Title VII.
Even if Congress did not expressly preempt state laws that
interfered with testing, an amendment to Title VII authorizing
the EEOC to use testers would preempt any state law that
interfered with EEOC testing under conflict preemption analy-
sis. The state laws would interfere with the Title VII
enforcement scheme envisaged by Congress and would then
stand as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purpose and objectives of Congress."326
Section 1104 provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates
to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision
of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
thereof.
Id. tit. XI, § 1104, 78 Stat. at 268 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4). "Accordingly, there
is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions of Title VII; these two sections provide a 'reliable indicum of congressional
intent .... ' Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 505 (1978)).
322. See supra Part II.
323. See supra Part V.
324. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
325. But see United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 733-34 (W.D. Wis. 1975)
(holding that a state law prohibiting the use of housing testers was an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the Fair Housing Act despite the fact that the Act
was silent on the issue of the use of testers).
326. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67); see also EEOC v.
County of Hennepin, 623 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1985). County of Hennepin involved a
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State contract claims or tort claims for fraud, maintenance,
or barratry levied against EEOC testers and their counsel
would be preempted by an amendment to Title VII authorizing
the EEOC to use testers because the state laws would inteifere
with Title VII's enforcement scheme. Moreover, the interests
sought to be protected by the ethics rules barring solicitation
and the laws of barratry and maintenance are not implicated by
the EEOC's conduct in investigating and challenging unlawful
employment practices.327  The EEOC is empowered to
investigate and litigate in the public interest to vindicate the
rights established by Title VII.328  The EEOC may not be
retained by a private individual, and it does not engage in
litigation for financial gain.
If Congress authorized the EEOC to use testers to uncover
discriminatory hiring practices in entry-level employment, any
uncertainty caused by the broad interpretations of the ethics
rules barring ex parte communications also would disappear.
The no-contact rules prohibit a lawyer's communications with
a represented party unless "authorized by law." A specific
statutory mandate would satisfy the "authorized by law"
exception.329
state law that required the EEOC to "seek district court enforcement for its
administrative subpoenas." Id. at 32. "As a part of its investigation, the EEOC
[sought] to examine the personnel files of 16 deputy sheriffs... . " Id. at 31 (restating
the plaintiff's allegations). Under its power to issue administrative subpoenas, the
EEOC issued a subpoena for the files. The state law, however, required a court order
before such information could be provided. Id.
The court decided that "the federal scheme would be frustrated if the EEOC had to
seek court orders to enforce EEOC subpoenas seeking information covered under the
[state law]." Id. at 32. The court noted that EEOC "investigations [would] be
significantly delayed if it must seek district court enforcement for its administrative
subpoenas." Id. The court concluded that the state law "frustrate[d] the federal scheme
embodied in Title VII. Id. Title VII, therefore, preempted the state law's requirement.
Id; see also Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1461 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) ("State immunity
laws stand as such obstacles to Congress's evident purpose in authorizing Title VII
suits against states, state subdivisions, and state officials, that Title VII must preempt
state immunity laws.").
327. Cf National Org. for Women v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 Fair Empl.
Prac. (BNA) 1176, 1179 (D. Minn. 1977) (holding that an order forbidding EEOC
attorneys from contacting current and prospective class members in Title VII class
actions can be upheld only insofar as it protects the interest in forbidding the
dissemination of misleading and erroneous information about the suit).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 306-13.
329. See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1450-51 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(noting that if a federal statute authorized government attorneys to question
represented parties in the absence of counsel, the "authorized by law" exception in the
ethics rule would be satisfied); Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560,
564 n.9 (D. Utah 1990) (holding that Rules 4.2 and DR 7-104 have no application to ex
parte contacts by counsel where a statute authorizes those contacts).
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VII. ENTRAPMENT
The objections of employer groups and others that testing by
the EEOC would constitute entrapment33 are unfounded as
applied to the model described in this Article because testers
merely provide an opportunity for employers to violate the law.
They do not induce or coerce employers to break the law in any
way.
When the Supreme Court first recognized entrapment as a
complete defense to a criminal charge in 1932,33' the Justices
disagreed about the source of the defense. Since that time,
most Justices have stated that the foundation of the defense is
Congress's intent in enacting the criminal statute in question.
In their view, the defense is based on the "notion that Congress
could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant
who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but
was induced to commit them by the Government."332 Other
members of the Court have written that the defense is based
not on congressional intent or statutory interpretation, but on
courts' supervisory power to protect the function and purity of
criminal proceedings.333
330. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Some commentators also have
noted the concern. See, e.g., David S. Bogen & Richard V. Falcon, The Use of Racial
Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REv. 59, 65 (1974) (stating that "there
smacks about the use of testers a sense of entrapment which is distasteful to most').
331. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (holding that where a
defendant is entrapped, the government cannot contend that the defendant is guilty).
332. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); see also Jacobson v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992) (stating that in enacting the criminal
statute in question, Congress did not intend that its processes of detection and
enforcement would be abused); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (referring to "the statutory defense of entrapment"); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (noting that Congress could not have intended
that its statutes would be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations);
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448 (stating that in enacting criminal statutes, Congress did not
intend that government officials would instigate an act on the part of persons otherwise
innocent in order to lure them to commit the act and punish them).
333. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58,67(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that "my differences with the Court have been based on statutory
interpretation and federal common law'); Hampton, 425 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because
his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because.., the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced' (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)));
Russell, 411 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the entrapment
defense "is not grounded in some unexpressed intent of Congress to exclude from
punishment ... [innocents] tempted into crime by the Government, but rather on the
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The Justices' views about the source of the entrapment
defense influence their formulations of its substantive content.
The majority have emphasized a "subjective approach," which
focuses "on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime."334 The other Justices have urged adoption
of an "objective approach," which focuses "exclusively on the
Government's conduct."335 Under the majority's view, the
entrapment issue is for the jury;36  under the objective
approach, it is for the court.337
The Court also has recognized that the conduct of law
enforcement officers investigating a crime might be "so outra-
geous that due process principles absolutely would bar the
belief that 'the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about
conviction cannot be countenanced'" (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring))); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380-81 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing
that because the defendant clearly violated the criminal statute, the source of the
entrapment defense must be the courts' supervisory jurisdiction); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
457 (Roberts, J., concurring) (proposing that the doctrine of entrapment rests not on the
statute in question but on the court's power to preserve the integrity of its
proceedings-"a fundamental rule of public policy").
334. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429; see also Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (holding that the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the crime); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73 (stating that to determine whether the
government set a trap for the "unwary innocent" or the "unwary criminal," the courts
"may examine the conduct of the government agent ... and... the accused will be
subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition'" (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451)); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442 (holding
that entrapment is established where "the criminal design originates with the officials
of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition
to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute").
335. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reaffirming his general
support for the objective approach but holding that stare decisis required the
application of the subjective approach); accord Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the focus "is not on the propensities and predisposition of a
specific defendant, but on 'whether the police conduct ... falls below standards ... for
the proper use of governmental power'" (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting))); Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that "the very
basis of the entrapment defense itself demands adherence to an approach that focuses
on the conduct of the government agents, rather than on whether the defendant was
'predisposed' or 'otherwise innocent'"); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383, 384 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that because permissible police activity should not vary according
to the particular defendant concerned, the test should focus not on the defendant's
predisposition but "the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered,
that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime"); Sorrells, 287 U.S.
at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring) (stating that any instigation and inducement by a
government officer should not be condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact that the
defendant had a bad reputation or had transgressed previously).
336. See, e.g., Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63.
337. See, e.g., Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion."33 Some members of the Court have suggested that this
due process component of the entrapment defense is not
available to a defendant who was predisposed to commit the
crime in question.339 Most Justices, however, have stated that
the due process rights of a predisposed defendant could be
violated by outrageous governmental investigative conduct."
Regardless of whether a predisposed defendant may invoke the
due process component of the entrapment defense, to satisfy its
requirements a defendant must show that the government's
conduct reached a high level of outrageousness that "shock[s]
the conscience of the court." "4 1
Although the entrapment defense traditionally has been
available only in criminal proceedings,342 the statutory inter-
pretation rationale for the defense and the alternate rationale
of protecting the integrity of the adjudicative process apply with
equal force to civil proceedings. 343 Thus, the defense has been
recognized in a tax refund proceeding 3" and in administrative
proceedings to revoke a doctor's license,345 a pharmacist's certifi-
cate of registration and permit,3" and a jockey's license.347
338. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32.
339. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
340. Id. at 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
341. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd
on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
342. See, e.g., Zwak v. United States, 848 F.2d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1988);
Rodriguez v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.P.R. 1982).
343. See Zwak, 848 F.2d at 1183-84 (arguing that the Sorrells rationale that
statutes should not be given an unreasonable construction applies in a suit challenging
a levy of an excise tax because Congress could not have intended to impose a tax upon
a taxpayer who was induced to commit the taxable act by the government); United
States v. Fifty Thousand Dollars United States Currency, 757 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir.
1985) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing that the same policy considerations underlying
the doctrine of entrapment in the criminal setting apply with equal force to a civil
forfeiture proceeding); Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 508 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal.
1973) (holding that because the defense of entrapment is crucial to the fair
administration of justice it should be recognized in an administrative proceeding);
Medley v. Maryville City Beer Bd., 726 S.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Tenn. 1987) (Fones, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the defense should apply in the civil context if the purpose of
the defense is preserving the dignity of and public confidence in the legal process).
344. Zwak, 848 F.2d at 1183-84.
345. Patty, 508 P.2d at 1122-25.
346. Fumusa v. Arizona State Bd. of Pharmacy, 545 P.2d 432, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976).
347. Smith v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 501 A.2d 303, 304 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985), rev'd, 535 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1988) (holding that the entrapment defense,
though sometimes available in the administrative context, was not available to the
defendant).
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Some courts, however, have ruled that the defense does not
apply in civil proceedings.34 s
Regardless of how the courts would or should rule on whether
the entrapment defense could be asserted in a Title VII action
against EEOC testers, the conduct of testers would not
constitute entrapment under any accepted formulation of the
defense because testers do not suggest illegal conduct to the
employer or encourage or induce the employer to discriminate
in any way. Testers merely afford the employer an opportunity
to violate the law. All members of the Court consistently have
agreed that the government may "afford opportunities ... for
the commission of [an] offense" without entrapping the
defendant.349
The Court has recognized consistently that "decoys may be
used" by law enforcement authorities. 3 0  This conclusion is
consistent with both the majority and minority views of the
substantive content of the entrapment defense. According to
348. One court held that the defense did not apply in an action to review the
disqualification of a supermarket from participation in the Food Stamps program
because the enforcement provisions of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2030 (1988), were intended to protect the public and not to punish, and
because the supermarket owner could continue to operate the business even if
disqualified from the program. Rodriguez v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 370, 374
(D.P.R. 1982). Another held that the defense did not apply in an action to suspend a
liquor license because the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages was highly
regulated. Medley v. Maryville City Beer Bd., 726 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. 1987).
Finally, one court ruled that the entrapment defense is not available in a civil forfeiture
proceeding because, to meet its statutory burden, the government need only show that
the defendant furnished money in exchange for a controlled substance. United States
v. Fifty Thousand Dollars United States Currency, 757 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1985).
It is not entirely clear that the lines drawn have some principled grounding in the
alternative rationales underlying the entrapment doctrine.
349. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); see also Jacobson v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992) (stating in dictum that an agent employed to stop
traffic in illegal drugs may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs and may make an
arrest on the spot or later because the ready commission of the criminal act amply
demonstrates the defendant's predisposition); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58,
66 (1988) ("Of course evidence that Government agents merely afforded an opportunity
or facilities for the commission of the crime would be insufficient to warrant [an
entrapment] instruction."); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973)
(holding that the use of deceit in law enforcement will not defeat a prosecution if the
government merely provides an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime); id.
at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that entrapment occurs only when an agent's
involvement in criminal activity goes beyond the offer of an opportunity to commit the
crime); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (stating that the fact that
government agents merely afford opportunities for the commission of an offense does
not constitute entrapment); id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same).
350. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445 (quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131
(4th Cir. 1924)).
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the prevailing subjective formulation of the defense, entrapment
occurs only when the criminal design originates in the minds of
the government officials, the government implants that design
in the mind of an innocent person, and the government induces
that person to commit the crime.351 Those Justices who favor
the alternative objective approach believe entrapment occurs
where the government unfairly induces an individual to commit
a crime.35 2 Regardless of the formulation, the conduct of testers
would not constitute entrapment. If an employer discriminates
against a tester, the design to discriminate originates in the
employer's mind. The tester does not induce or persuade the
employer to discriminate in any way.
Entrapment requires active and persistent government
inducement. Most recently, in Jacobson v. United States,53 the
Court held that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law
where the government induced him to order child pornography
through the mails by repeated pleas, offers, and deception over
a twenty-six month period.35' In Sorrells v. United States,355 the
Court held that the entrapment defense was available where
government agents lured a defendant to violate a prohibition
statute "by repeated and persistent solicitation ... [and] by
taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of
their experience as companions in arms in the [First] World
War."3 56 In Sherman v. United States, 357 the Court held that
the defendant, who was undergoing medical treatment to over-
come narcotics addiction, was entrapped as a matter of law
where a government agent enticed the defendant not only to
sell drugs to the agent but also to return to a drug habit. The
Court explained that the government agent appealed to the
351. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540; Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62-63; id. at 67-68 (Scalia,
J., concurring); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (plurality op.);
Russell, 411 U.S. at 434-36; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
352. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492-93 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that
entrapment was properly applied in cases where the government encouraged or
otherwise acted in concert with the defendant); id. at 498-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that conduct that deliberately entices an individual to commit a crime and is
the product of the creative activity of government officials constitutes entrapment);
Russell, 411 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that government conduct that
"could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to
commit it" constitutes entrapment regardless of whether the defendant in fact had
criminal propensities).
353. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
354. Id. at 1543.
355. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
356. Id. at 441.
357. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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defendant's sympathy by explaining that the agent needed
drugs because he was not responding to treatment and was
"suffering," that the agent had to request the drugs several
times to overcome the defendant's refusal, evasiveness, and
then hesitancy, that the defendant made no profit from the
sales, and that the agent induced the defendant to return to his
drug habit.3" The conduct of testers is easily distinguishable
from the conduct found to be entrapment in Jacobson, Sorrells,
and Sherman. Testers do not suggest the illegal act or offer
any inducement to the employer to discriminate.
For the same reasons, the conduct of testers would not violate
due process principles. Though the Court has never discussed
in any detail the type of "undercover" investigative conduct that
would violate due process, Judge Friendly once gave an
example of the requisite conduct. He wrote,
It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit govern-
ment agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to
gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of
hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving partici-
pation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its
citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluc-
tant to sanction.359
The conduct of testers does not rise to the level contemplated by
Judge Friendly.
There are no cases discussing whether the conduct of testers
in employment discrimination actions constitutes entrapment.
Courts have ruled, however, that testers used to identify
discriminatory housing practices do not entrap the realtor or
housing owner defendant. In one case, the representative of a
realty company told a white tester who was masquerading as
a buyer that the property owner would not sell to blacks. The
court ruled that there was no entrapment because the tester
merely provided the defendant with an opportunity to violate
the law.36° The other courts and the commentators that have
addressed the issue in the housing context agree.36 ' In other
358. Id. at 371, 373, 375-76.
359. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
360. Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407, 415 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
361. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (Fair Housing Act
action); J. Howard Brandt, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Human Relations Comm'n, 324 A.2d
840, 841-42 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (action under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act);
480 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
civil contexts, courts have held that providing an opportunity to
violate the law is not entrapment, even where the undercover
agent suggests the illegal activity.11
2
A tester does not even suggest the illegal activity. Therefore,
a tester does not entrap the employer who discriminates. An
employer would have a valid entrapment defense against a
tester or decoy only if the tester or decoy persuaded or actively
induced the employer to violate the law s. 3 " EEOC testers would
James P. Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159, 205-06 &
n.271 (1973); Skinner, supra note 62, at 187 (arguing that the concern with entrapment
is unfounded because the testing agency "is merely creating conditions under which
discrimination may occur and is there to record it if it does").
362. A court has ruled that pharmacy board investigators who presented a
pharmacist with false prescription orders merely gave the pharmacist the opportunity
to dispense drugs unlawfully. Fumusa v. Arizona State Bd. of Pharmacy, 545 P.2d 432,
434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). In an action challenging a liquor license suspension, a court
ruled that police may use a minor as a decoy to attempt to make illegal purchases from
a licensed establishment. Medley v. Maryville City Beer Bd., 726 S.W.2d 891, 893
(Tenn. 1987). Investigators of a state board of chiropractic examiners who contacted
a doctor to ask him to write fraudulent sick slips and disability certificates to justify
absences from employment did not entrap the doctor. Crafton v. State Bd. of
Chiropractic Examiners, 693 S.W.2d 320, 321-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 508 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1973), is problematic. In
Patty, a license revocation proceeding, the California Supreme Court held that there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that investigators hired
by the California Board of Medical Examiners entrapped a doctor. The doctor wrote
prescriptions for amphetamines and other drugs for the investigators without a
legitimate clinical basis, but the investigators simply asked the doctor for the
prescriptions. If the court was adopting as California law the substance of the defense
recognized by the Supreme Court in Sorrells and its progeny, the case probably is
decided wrongly. The court noted, however, some characteristics of the case that take
it outside the realm of the typical decoy or tester case in which the tester or decoy
merely affords the defendant the opportunity to violate the law. First, there may have
been some racist motivation to the investigation of Dr. Patty. The court noted that Dr.
Patty was the first black graduate of his medical school. Id. at 1123. It also noted that
rather than being instructed to see if Dr. Patty would seize an opportunity to prescribe
drugs illegally, the investigators were told "to 'work doctors' to get illegal prescriptions,
almost a directive to entrap." Id. at 1130. The California Supreme Court emphasized
that the investigators were "young women" and Dr. Patty was an "elderly male"
(incidentally, Dr. Patty was fifty-one years old). Id. at 1129-30. There also was
evidence that the doctor was susceptible to the investigators' requests because of illness,
not because of a predisposition to break the law. During the time he was solicited, Dr.
Patty was suffering from fatigue, instability, and chest pain, and he had been
hospitalized for his conditions. The court emphasized that the investigators were aware
of Patty's condition. Id. at 1124. Therefore, Patty does not support the proposition that
testers in Title VII actions unlawfully induce or persuade employers to violate the law.
363. There also would be no Fourth Amendment bar to the use of testers by the
EEOC as outlined in this Article. In Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States,
605 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1979), the court stated that even if testers posing as prospective
home buyers were state actors, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
the realtors who did business with them in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 1355. It
reasoned that
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merely apply for employment. If instructed properly, they
would actually try to get the employer to extend an offer. They
would not induce or coerce the employer to discriminate in any
way. They would not suggest illegal conduct. If an employer
discriminates against a tester, the intent to violate the law
truly originated in the mind of the employer.
Moreover, it now appears settled that the entrapment defense
is statutory and based on the assumption that Congress would
not have intended a statute to be applied to a defendant who
was induced improperly to violate it. 364 If Congress specifically
authorized the EEOC to use testers to enforce Title VII, con-
gressional intent would be clear: Title VII may be used to
sanction employers who violate the rights of testers to be
treated equally. Thus, assuming that the doctrine of civil
entrapment would apply in Title VII actions, employers who
discriminate against EEOC testers would not be able to rely on
the entrapment defense to excuse their conduct.365
testers did no more than what any member of the home-buying public is invited,
and indeed welcomed, to do.... The testers did not enter into any restricted
areas of the office... [or] examine or take any confidential or private papers.
... [Tihe testers behaved exactly as a prospective home buyer visiting a real
estate office would be expected to behave. To the extent that [the realtor] has
held itself open to the public for just the sorts of visits that transpired there, [the
realtor] cannot complain that a privacy interest has been thwarted or
embarrassed. *
Id. (footnote omitted). This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), that "[a] government agent, in the same
manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter
upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant." Id. at 211; see
also United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Centennial Builders, Inc., 747 F.2d 678,682-83 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Medic
House, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1531, 1538-39 (W.D. Mo. 1989); United States v. Spars, 657
F. Supp. 730, 731-32 (D. Minn. 1986).
The result would be different if the testers entered areas without authorization or
seized private papers. See, e.g., Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211-12. Courts also have refused
to enforce administrative agency subpoenas based on information obtained by an
enforcement agent who gained access to a target's premises by invoking governmental
power and misrepresenting the nature of the visit to the premises. See, e.g., SEC v.
ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316-17 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (stating that
under their supervisory power, courts may refuse to enforce administrative subpoenas
for abuse of process where a government agent betrays an individual's trust to gain
access to otherwise unaccessible records). The same result occurs under the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. A ruse entry is not consensual where a suspect is
informed that the person seeking entry is a government agent, but the suspect is
misinformed as to the purpose for which the agent seeks entry. United States v. Bosse,
898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990).
364. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
365. As a matter of law, the entrapment defense could not be asserted to challenge
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CONCLUSION
Congress should amend Title VII to give the EEOC the power
to use testers to uncover discrimination in hiring for lower-
skilled, entry-level jobs. The focus on lower-skilled, entry-level
positions is appropriate. The costs to employers imposed by
testing for such discrimination are outweighed by the potential
benefits of redressing conduct that often may go unchallenged
the conduct of private party testers because state action is required. See United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that a defendant
who was induced, provoked, or tempted into committing a crime by a private person
may not claim entrapment); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379-80 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that the entrapment defense is limited to cases
involving acts of government agents or informers and not private persons); Schieb v.
Humane Soc'y, 582 F. Supp. 717, 725-26 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that Humane
Society officials who organized a dog fight for purposes of aiding the prosecution of
participants did not violate the participants' due process rights because the officials'
actions were not taken under color of state law).
An employer might argue that a private tester's action nonetheless should be
dismissed because the tester comes to the court with "unclean hands." This defense is
available in civil actions brought by private parties. Cf Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Always the courts refuse their aid in
civil cases to the perpetration and consummation of an illegal scheme."). Courts have
recognized that the doctrine applies in Title VII actions. See, e.g., Hargett v. Delta
Automotive, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Carpenter v. Ford Motor
Co., 761 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Women Employed v. Rinella & Rinella, 468 F.
Supp. 1123, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The unclean hands doctrine, however, is related
intimately to the entrapment defense. As long as a tester acts in a way that merely
affords the employer the opportunity to discriminate, the unclean hands doctrine would
not be a viable defense for the employer. A court may deny relief to a plaintiff if, in
connection with the transaction under consideration, the plaintiff is guilty of miscon-
duct, fraud, or bad faith toward the defendant. Great W. Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476
F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979). Testers would not
violate the good faith requirement of the unclean hands doctrine because merely
providing an opportunity for an individual to violate the law through the use of a decoy
is not the sort of bad faith or fraud prohibited by the doctrine. Cf. Medley, 726 S.W.2d
at 893 (stating that employing a minor to purchase alcohol from a licensed establish-
ment would not justify any mitigation of the sanctions imposed upon the licensee under
an unclean hands principle).
Active misconduct is necessary to run afoul of the unclean hands doctrine. Rinella
& Rinella, 468 F. Supp. at 1128 (applying the unclean hands defense where, subsequent
to her discharge, plaintiff and other members of the plaintiff organization handed out
leaflets criticizing the employer; mobbed the lobby in its building, interfering with its
business; went to a convention and criticized the employer's practices; handed out
leaflets in the neighborhood of one of the employer's principals; harassed some of the
employer's former clients and sent them derogatory letters about the employer; and
filed meritless complaints against the employer with various administrative agencies).
Thus, if private party testers flooded an employer with applications, thereby interfering
with the employer's business and constituting harassment, the unclean hands doctrine
might apply.
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because of substantial disincentives to suit. Eliminating
discrimination in hiring for those jobs is important because they
offer the opportunity to establish a foothold in the formal
economy. Testers could fill the void in enforcement resulting
from the substantial disincentives to suit.
EEOC enforcement would solve problems associated with
relying on private groups or individuals to use testers to fill the
enforcement void. The EEOC can sue on behalf of testers and
obtain appropriate relief. It does not rely on attorneys' fee
awards to fund its litigation efforts. Congress could assure that
testing would be used solely to fill the enforcement void by
limiting the use of testing to uncovering discrimination in
hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level positions. Congress could
prohibit private parties from engaging in testing without the
approval of the EEOC. Moreover, if Congress authorized the
EEOC to use testers, state laws that interfered with EEOC
testing activities would be preempted.
Finally, testing by the EEOC would not be inconsistent with
the EEOC's role in enforcing Title VII. Employer representa-
tives have argued that the use of testers by the EEOC would be
inconsistent with the agency's duty to attempt to conciliate
disputes and its role as a neutral investigator.366 Additionally,
some judges have written that, unless an employer receives
notice of and is involved in an investigation of suspected
employment discrimination, the employer will not settle
disputes and comply voluntarily with Title VII.367 These views
of the nature of settlements are naive. Employers do not agree
to settle cases as a reward for docile and superficial
investigations and enforcement. Employers decide whether to
settle cases based on the amount and strength of evidence of
discrimination that has been uncovered. More aggressive
investigation by the EEOC might actually increase settlements
and voluntary compliance.36 8  While EEOC investigations
366. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439, 449 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978).
368. In fact, one of the reasons Congress amended the statute in 1972 to give the
EEOC the right to sue respondents in civil actions was the realization that without that
power "[c]onciliation alone ha[d] not succeeded in ending discriminatory employment
practices, nor d[id] it show any reasonable promise of doing so." 2 EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 644 (1972).
Respondents generally were not agreeable to accepting EEOC decisions where
discriminatory practices were found because the conciliation provisions were voluntary
and many employees did not have the financial resources to bring suit. Id. at 426.
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theoretically are neutral, the Commission is charged with
enforcing Title VII and uncovering violations. The EEOC's
relationship with respondents is more realistically viewed as at
least potentially adversarial.6 9 As long as respondents are
permitted to submit evidence and the Commission objectively
considers their arguments, the agency's duty of fairness is
satisfied.37 °
The EEOC could engage in testing to uncover discrimination
in hiring for lower-skilled, entry-level jobs without upsetting
the relationship between respondents and the EEOC. More-
over, EEOC testing would fill a gap in enforcement of Title VII
in an area of critical importance. EEOC testing to fill that gap
would help fulfill Congress's original goal-to assure equality
in labor-force participation.
Congress thought that the power to initiate suit would be an impetus to settlement,
because it represented a tangible threat to employers. Congress recognized that the
EEOC needed some real power to obtain voluntary cooperation.
369. See Katz, supra note 267, at 879; cf. Euidence, supra note 280, at 2037 (1988)
(noting that although the investigator is not an advocate for the charging party, she
must be particularly diligent in searching out evidence tending to support the charging
party's case).
370. See Euidence, supra note 280, at 2038 (1988) (stating that the respondent and
the charging party each should be given the opportunity to respond to the other's
evidence prior to analysis by the EEOC).
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